The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mark W. Bennett U.S. District Court Judge Northern District OF Iowa
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 3 A. Factual Background ............................................................... 3 B. Procedural Background ........................................................... 5 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 7 A. Reconsideration Of Summary Judgment In Rattray's Favor ............... 8 1. Arguments of the parties .................................................. 8 2. Reconsideration standards .............................................. 10 3. Analysis .................................................................... 13 a. The basis for summary judgment in Rattray's case ....... 13 b. The decision in Florence ....................................... 16 c. The effect of Florence on the controlling legal rule ...... 23 B. Consideration Of Summary Judgment In The County's Favor .......... 29 1. Arguments of the parties ................................................ 30 2. Summary judgment standards ......................................... 32 3. "No reasonable suspicion" claims .................................... 33 4. "Manner" claims ......................................................... 38 a. Rattray's "manner" claim ...................................... 39 b. Mathes's "manner" claim ...................................... 41 c. Lambert's "manner" claim .................................... 43 5. Summary ................................................................... 45 C. Reconsolidation Of Trials ....................................................... 45 D. Certification For Interlocutory Appeal ....................................... 46 1. Certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) .................................. 46 2. Certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)...................... 50 III. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 52
In these consolidated cases, the plaintiffs assert that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when they were strip searched without reasonable suspicion that they were carrying contraband, upon being booked into the county jail. These cases are back before me on the defendant county's motions for reconsideration of a prior order granting summary judgment in one plaintiff's favor on her claim and seeking summary judgment in the county's favor on all of the plaintiffs' claims in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). In Florence, the Supreme Court held that every detainee, even one held on a non-indictable offense, who will be admitted to the jail's "general population" may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed without reasonable suspicion that the detainee is hiding contraband. The county argues that, by reasonable extension, Florence bars the claims of the plaintiffs, because the undisputed facts show that they were likely to have substantial contact with other detainees during their temporary detention, even if they were not admitted to "general population" per se. The plaintiffs argue that Florence is inapplicable, because none of the plaintiffs were admitted to "general population" in the jail, so that circuit precedent requiring reasonable suspicion to strip search detainees still prevails in their circumstances.
As is my usual practice, I set forth here only those facts, disputed and undisputed, sufficient to put in context the parties' arguments concerning the defendant's motions for summary judgment. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts recited here are undisputed, at least for purposes of summary judgment. I will discuss additional factual allegations, and the extent to which they are or are not disputed or material, if necessary, in my legal analysis.
In the early morning hours of August 19, 2006, Maureen Rattray, the original plaintiff in this action, was arrested on a serious misdemeanor charge of operating while intoxicated -- first offense, in violation of IOWA CODE § 321J.2. She was taken to the Woodbury County Jail, where she was strip searched in accordance with a then-existing jail policy that required all persons booked on charges of a serious misdemeanor or greater to be strip searched. The strip search was not based on any reasonable suspicion analysis of whether Rattray might be carrying contraband. Rattray contends that the strip search involved more than a visual body inspection, as it included improper touching and other aggravating circumstances that were not part of the jail policy. After the strip search, Rattray was escorted to a temporary holding cell under what she also argues were aggravating circumstances. At no time did Rattray share a cell with any other detainee, nor was she ever admitted to the jail's "general population." This was so, because detainees were not admitted to the jail's "general population" during the first twenty-four hours of their detention. On the morning of August 19, 2006, several hours after her arrest, Rattray was shackled with other detainees and escorted to court for an initial appearance and arraignment before a magistrate judge. The trip to court was Rattray's only interaction with other detainees during her detention. Rattray was released from jail on August 19, 2006, soon after her arraignment.
Plaintiffs Lisa Lambert and Lori Mathes, the plaintiffs in additional actions consolidated with Rattray's, were also arrested on serious misdemeanor charges. Lambert was arrested on March 17, 2007, on a charge listed on her booking sheet as serious domestic assault. Mathes was arrested on May 7, 2007, on a charge of possession of marijuana. Like Rattray, both were taken to the Woodbury County Jail for booking and both were strip searched pursuant to the then-existing jail policy. Neither strip search was based on any reasonable suspicion analysis of whether either might be carrying contraband. The parties dispute whether Lambert and Mathes were subjected only to visual body inspections, or to visual cavity searches, and other circumstances of the strip searches. During the search of Lambert, officers discovered a small knife. Lambert and Mathes were taken to temporary holding cells after the searches.
The County contends, and the plaintiffs dispute, that detainees may potentially be housed with other detainees upon their initial admission to the jail; that it is not uncommon for detainees to be "doubled up" in a holding cell, depending on the number of arrests that have occurred during the period of detention; and that the need to house detainees with other detainees can change rapidly, because of the limited number of holding cells at the jail. Like Rattray, Mathes never shared a holding cell with another detainee, and neither Lambert nor Mathes was ever admitted to the "general population" at the jail, because neither was held for more than twenty-four hours. However, in their briefing, the County contends, and Lambert admits, that she shared a holding cell with other detainees (at least two, and possibly "several") during the night. The parties agree that, like Rattray, Mathes was handcuffed with other detainees (in Mathes's case, eight other detainees) when she was transported to court for her initial appearance. The parties have not indicated in their respective statements of fact whether Lambert was handcuffed with other detainees for transportation to court for her initial appearance. Like Rattray, Lambert and Mathes were both released shortly after their arraignments-in Lambert's case, the day after her arrest, and in Mathes's case, the same day as her arrest.
The procedural history for this case is long and convoluted. Some of it has been addressed in prior published rulings. See Rattray v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 253 F.R.D. 444 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (denying class certification after consolidation of separate actions by plaintiffs Rattray, Mathes, and Lambert, and assertion of class claims), aff'd,614 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2010); Rattray v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment). Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that the plaintiffs asserted claims that their strip searches without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that I declined to certify the action as a class action on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons. However, I did grant summary judgment in plaintiff Rattray's favor on her claim of liability for violating her rights, and severed her damages claim for a separate trial before the trial of Lambert's and Mathes's liability and damages claims.
In the midst of preparations for Rattray's damages trial, the parties agreed to dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants, so that Rattray's claims proceeded to trial only against the County. A jury awarded Rattray substantial damages on her claim on January 20, 2011, see Verdict Form (docket no. 132); Amended Verdict Form (docket no. 133), but, owing to seriously problematic circumstances surrounding the jury's damages awards, I granted the County's Motion For New Trial (docket no. 144) by Order (docket no. 147), filed March 7, 2011.
This case was then stayed during the pendency, before the Supreme Court, of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 220710 (Jan. 19, 2011), cert. granted, 2011 WL 202772 (April 4, 2011), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). I entered an Order (docket no. 164) on May 2, 2012, lifting the stay and directing the parties to file a proposed Scheduling Order establishing deadlines and trial readiness dates for a retrial on Rattray's damages claim and a trial on Lambert's and Mathes's liability and damages claims that would provide for the prompt and efficient disposition in each case. By Order (docket no. 173), dated July 3, 2012, Rattray's damages claim was set for retrial on March 11, 2013, and by Order (Case No. C 08-4008, docket no. 17, and Case No. C 08-4032-MWB, docket no. 14), dated July 3, 2012, Lambert's and Mathes's liability and damages claims were set for trial on April 22, 2013.*fn1
On September 28, 2012, the new deadline for dispositive motions, the County filed its Motion To Reconsider Ruling On Rattray's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment And [Its] Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (docket no. 176) and also filed its Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding Mathes And Lambert (docket no. 177). In those Motions, the County argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Florence not only requires that I reconsider my order granting summary judgment on liability in favor of Rattray, but that I now grant summary judgment in the County's favor on all three plaintiffs' claims that a strip search of detainees without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Rattray filed her Resistance (docket no. 181) to the County's Motion, as to her, on October 31, 2012, and Lambert and Mathes filed their Resistance (docket no. 182) to the County's Motion, as to them, on November 1, 2012. The County filed Replies (docket nos. 183 and 184) in further support of its Motions on November 7, 2012.
The County requested oral arguments on its Motions. Because my crowded schedule has not permitted the timely scheduling of such oral arguments, and I find that the parties have thoroughly briefed the issues, I will consider the Motions fully submitted on the written submissions.
Although the central issue in both of the County's Motions is the impact of Florence, that issue is raised in somewhat different procedural contexts as to Rattray, on the one hand, and as to Lambert and Mathes, on the other. Specifically, the County seeks reconsideration of my prior summary judgment ruling in Rattray's favor on her "no reasonable suspicion" strip-search claim, but there is no summary judgment ruling in favor of Lambert and Mathes to set aside. The County also seeks summary judgment or partial summary judgment in its favor on all three plaintiffs' strip-search claims. In a footnote in its brief supporting its motion as to Rattray, the County acknowledges that a factual question exists regarding the "manner" in which Rattray's strip search was conducted, not simply that a strip search was done with "no reasonable suspicion." Consequently, the County explains that it is only seeking partial summary judgment on Rattray's claims. There is no such limitation on the County's Motion For Summary Judgment on Lambert's and Mathes's claims. Nevertheless, I read Lambert's and Mathes's Resistance to suggest that they believe that they also have both "no reasonable suspicion" and "manner" strip-search claims. There is, thus, considerable overlap of the issues as to whether or not the County is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on any of the plaintiffs' claims. Therefore, I will first consider, separately, whether the Florence decision requires me to reconsider and withdraw my grant of summary judgment in favor of Rattray on her "no reasonable suspicion" strip-search claim. I will then consider whether the County is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on one or more of plaintiffs' strip-search claims.
A.Reconsideration Of Summary Judgment In Rattray's Favor
1.Arguments of the parties
The County argues that, while there was a split in the circuits prior to Florence as to the constitutionality of a strip search of detainees without reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court determined in Florence that the Fourth Amendment does not require reasonable suspicion before a detainee is strip searched for non-indictable offenses. Thus, the County argues, no constitutional violation occurs simply because a strip search of a detainee was conducted absent reasonable suspicion. The County points out that I previously granted summary judgment on liability in Rattray's favor precisely on the ground that she was strip searched without reasonable suspicion, so that it is no longer appropriate to let that ruling stand. The County argues that this is so, even though the Supreme Court did not specifically address cases where a detainee might be detained in a holding area and not admitted into "general population" of a jail, because the Court's rationale concerning the risks of failing to discover contraband should apply to detention situations in which detainees have substantial contact with other detainees. The County also argues that Rattray cannot generate any genuine issue of material fact that the strip-search policy was an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security. The County argues that this is so, because detainees at the County Jail are potentially housed with other detainees upon initial admission into the jail, as circumstances may require "doubling up" in holding cells, and after placement in temporary holding, detainees are not searched again before being shackled with other detainees and transported to the courtroom for their initial appearances.
Rattray argues that Florence simply does not apply here, so that there has been no intervening change in controlling law. Rattray reads the Supreme Court's decision to limit the issue before the Court to be whether detainees who will be admitted to the general population of a jail may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed. She also reads the concurring opinions to painstakingly limit the Court's holding to detainees admitted to "general population" and to avoid a rule barring a reasonable suspicion requirement in other circumstances. She contends that there is no dispute that at no time was she a detainee who would be admitted to the "general population," because detainees at the County Jail were not admitted to "general population" during their first twenty-four hours of detention, and she was never required to share a holding cell. Indeed, she asserts baldly that she did not have substantial contact with other detainees. She also argues that her strip search was more invasive than the visual body inspection at issue in Florence. Thus, she argues that the facts in her case fall squarely within the particularized series of cases to which the Supreme Court unequivocally said its holding in Florence did not extend. Therefore, she argues that there was no intervening change in controlling law and that my prior grant of summary judgment in her favor was not clearly or manifestly erroneous.*fn2
In reply, the County asserts that, contrary to Rattray's reading, the main issue in Florence was whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the more invasive search procedures at issue, that is, strip searches without touching by jail officers, absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. The County argues that, with that issue foremost, the Supreme Court concluded that the detection of contraband was so critical to jail security that the imposition of a complicated constitutional scheme prior to conducting a strip search of detainees would be unmanageable. The County argues that Rattray has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that the strip search was an exaggerated response to jail security issues. The County also argues that Rattray mistakenly focuses on the "general population" language in Florence, instead of on the "substantial contact" with other detainees rationale for that decision.
In Kirt v. Fashion Bug # 3252, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Iowa 2007), I addressed a district court's authority to reconsider an order granting summary judgment, as follows:
This court has previously found that Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides authority for a court to reconsider any interlocutory order, including a prior ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 467 F.Supp.2d 925, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Wells' Dairy, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, 336 F.Supp.2d 906, 909 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (citing cases). Specifically, Rule 54(b) provides that, unless the court certifies the order for interlocutory appeal, "any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, this court has repeatedly held that it has the inherent power to reconsider and revise any interlocutory order, such as a summary judgment ruling, up until the time that a final judgment is entered. Wells' Dairy, Inc., 336 F.Supp.2d at 909 (citing Kaydon Acquisition Corp. v. Custum Mfg., Inc., 317 F.Supp.2d 896, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2004); Helm Financial Corp. v. Iowa N. Ry. Co., 214 F.Supp.2d 934, 999 (N.D. Iowa 2002); and Longstreth v. Copple, 189 F.R.D. 401, 403 (N.D. Iowa 1999)).
Kirt, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 964-65. Rattray does not dispute my authority to reconsider the order granting summary judgment in her favor on her "no reasonable suspicion" strip-search claim, and I reiterate my conclusion in Kirt and other decisions that I have such authority.
In Kirt, I also considered the standards applicable to reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling pursuant to Rule 54(b), as follows:
This court has also noted, "The exact standard applicable to the granting of a motion under Rule 54(b) is not clear, though it is typically held to be less exacting than would be [applicable to] a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which is in turn less exacting than the standards enunciated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)." [Wells' Dairy, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 909.] Although the standards for reconsideration of interlocutory orders may be less "exacting" than the standards for reconsideration of final orders under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), this court has nevertheless held that it should look to the general principles under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) for guidance when reconsidering a summary judgment ruling pursuant to Rule 54(b). Id. (citing Bragg v. Robertson, 183 F.R.D. 494, 496 (S.D. W. Va. 1998)).
Kirt, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 965.
Looking for such guidance in Kirt, I noted that, "[u]nder Rule 59(e), a judgment may be amended to correct 'clearly' or 'manifestly' erroneous findings of fact or conclusions of law." Id. I now note that Rule 60(b)(5) also provides relief "from a final judgment," inter alia, if "applying it prospectively is no longer equitable." FED.
R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "[w]hen prospective relief is at issue, a change in decisional law provides sufficient justification for Rule 60(b)(5) relief," Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. National Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 F.3d 897, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added), but that court has also explained that "'[a] change in the law following a judgment does not merit relief under Rule 60(b)(5),'" In re Racing Servs., Inc., 571 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting 12 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE at § 60.46);
see also Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Reimer & Kroger Assocs., Inc., 194 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a change in the law that would have governed the dispute, had the dispute not already been decided, is not by itself an "extraordinary" or "exceptional" circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6)). Even in the circumstance of a final judgment providing prospective relief, such as a consent decree for injunctive relief, there must be an intervening controlling decision that actually changes the law in a way applicable to the case. Compare White v. National Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an intervening Supreme Court decision addressed a different issue, so that it was inapposite, and its rationale also did not apply to the context of the litigation before the court), with Prudential Ins. Co., 413 F.3d at 905 (concluding that "not only was there a substantial subsequent change in the law but also the movant's original decision not to file a writ of certiorari was reasonable because the Supreme Court had recently declined to consider similar issues in two cases").
I believe that the Rule 60(b)(5) "change in the law" standard for a final order granting prospective relief provides guidance for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 54(b) of an interlocutory order granting summary judgment, because continuing to rely on superseded law in a pending case, as in a case involving prospective relief, "is no longer equitable." Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not expressly done so, other Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressly recognized that reconsidering the grant or denial of summary judgment in light of an intervening change in controlling law is appropriate, pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule
60. See, e.g., Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 551--52 (6th Cir.2012) (citing Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010), and Rule 59); McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that reconsideration of an order granting summary judgment pursuant to a 59(e) motion requires new evidence, a change in the law, or a clearly erroneous decision); Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 569 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that a district court may reconsider a denial of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) when there has been "an intervening change in controlling law") (citation omitted).
Therefore, I conclude that an intervening change in controlling law is sufficient to reconsider and set aside an interlocutory order granting summary judgment.
a.The basis for summary judgment in Rattray's case
To determine whether or not Florence is a change in controlling law, I must first review the basis on which I granted summary judgment in favor of Rattray on her unlawful strip-search claim. In their summary judgment motions, the plaintiffs sought summary judgment on four issues:
(1) that the defendants' strip search policy was facially unconstitutional; (2) that the individual defendants, the sheriff and assistant chief deputy sheriff, are not entitled to qualified immunity in this case; (3) that the defendants conducted the strip searches in question pursuant to the defendant county's unconstitutional "blanket" strip search policy and, therefore, have the burden to establish post hoc reasonable suspicion for each search to avoid liability; and
(4) that the defendants have failed to generate genuine issues of material fact concerning reasonable suspicion, even post hoc, to support the strip searches of the plaintiffs.
Rattray, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-26. However, I denied the plaintiffs' request for summary judgment on the first and third questions, "as moot, as unnecessary to the resolution of the case, and as an unnecessary determination of constitutional questions," where the jail policy was no longer in place. Id. at 1028 (summary); see also id. at 1027-28 (analysis).
Next, as to the second question on which the plaintiffs sought summary judgment, I determined,
[T]he proper questions for purposes of determining qualified immunity in this case are whether it was clearly established that a misdemeanor arrestee has a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment not to be strip searched in the absence of reasonable suspicion and whether the officers conducted the strip searches of these arrestees without reasonable suspicion, thus violating their constitutional rights.
Rattray, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1028-29 (emphasis added). I then addressed those questions in turn.
As to the first of these dispositive questions, I found as follows:
[A]t the time of the strip searches at issue here, it was clearly established that a strip search without reasonable suspicion violates a misdemeanor arrestee's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741--42 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding a strip search of an arrestee violated the Fourth Amendment where authorities had no reasonable suspicion of concealed weapons or contraband); see also Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Our court, like many others, had concluded that a strip search of adult offenders without individualized suspicion was unreasonable, but those cases did not consider the different interests involved when the State has responsibility to act in loco parentis [as to juvenile offenders]."). The only authority to the contrary offered by the defendants is Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008), but that decision is both not controlling, because it is out-of-circuit, and after the fact, as it was handed down after the Department had already changed its policy to require reasonable suspicion for strip searches, so it could not have caused any confusion about the constitutionality of the defendants' conduct Rattray, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. Therefore, I concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the first question, whether it was clearly established that a misdemeanor arrestee has a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment not to be strip searched in the absence of reasonable suspicion.
I considered the second question separately as to Rattray, on the one hand, and Lambert and Mathes, on the other. See id. at 1029-32. I concluded "that the defendants ha[d] failed to generate any genuine issues of material fact that the strip search of plaintiff Rattray could have been justified, post hoc, by reasonable suspicion." Id. at 1029. More specifically, I concluded,
[T]he defendants ha[d] made no showing, even post hoc, that officials responsible for strip searching plaintiff Rattray based (or could have based) the strip search on specific objective facts and rational inferences that they were entitled to draw from the facts known to them, in light of their experience, to establish the required individualized, reasonable suspicion specifically directed to plaintiff Rattray. McDonell [v. Hunter], 809 F.2d [1302,] 1307 [(8th Cir. 1987)]. Although the officers may be entitled to show that they could have based a strip search on reasonable suspicion, logically, such reasonable suspicion would have to be based on what the officers did know at the time of the strip search, not what they could have known, but did not.
Rattray, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1030 (emphasis in the original). Moreover, I concluded that Rattray was not only entitled to summary judgment that the individual defendants did not have qualified immunity, but on her claim "that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from a strip search in the absence of reasonable suspicion." Id. at 1030. These conclusions meant that "the only remaining issue as to plaintiff Rattray's claims pertains to what, if any, damages she is entitled to receive for the violation of her constitutional rights." Id. at 1031.
In short, the only question of violation of Fourth Amendment rights that I addressed on summary judgment was whether a misdemeanor arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights are violated by a strip search not based on reasonable suspicion. I did not address any claim that an otherwise constitutionally permissible strip search- that is, one based on reasonable suspicion-could be conducted in a manner that would nevertheless violate a detainee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.*fn3 I also based my conclusion that a strip search of a misdemeanor arrestee without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment on then-controlling ...