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United States v. Hayes

United States District Court, Eighth Circuit

June 7, 2013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIE HAYES, Defendant.

SENTENCING OPINION AND STATEMENT OF REASONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) EXPLAINING A POLICY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE METHAMPHETAMINE GUIDELINES

MARK W. BENNETT, Chief District Judge.

This case raises the question of the merits of the United States Sentencing Guidelines[1] range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, for defendants convicted of methamphetamine offenses. In my nineteen years on the federal bench, I have sent over 3, 500 people to prison, the majority of whom are drug offenders. Methamphetamine is the primary drug type involved in drug-trafficking offenses in the Northern District of Iowa. In 2011, methamphetamine offenses made up 18.1% of the drug trafficking offenses across the country. BOOKER REPORT, PART C: DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSES, METHAMPHETAMINE, at 1. That same year, methamphetamine offenses made up 72.3% of the drug trafficking offenses in the Northern District of Iowa. Id. at 2.

This Sentencing Memorandum supplements findings made on the record at defendant Willie Hayes's sentencing hearing on June 3, 2013.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Indictment, Guilty Plea, And Sentencing Hearing

On March 21, 2012, an Indictment was returned against Hayes, with the charge that he did knowingly and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate, and agree, with others whose identities are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully possess with the intent to distribute 5 grams or more actual (pure) methamphetamine or 50 grams of a methamphetamine mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance within 1, 000 feet of Irving Elementary School, located in Sioux City, Woodbury County, Iowa, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 860, and 846. On January 30, 2013, Hayes pled guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand to Count 1 of the four-count superseding indictment, pursuant to a plea agreement (docket no. 76). Count 1 charged Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute 35 Grams or More of Methamphetamine Actual, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B). On that same day, I accepted Hayes's guilty plea. A probation officer then prepared a presentence report ("PSR"). The PSR found that Hayes was a Career Offender because of two predicate felony convictions. On May 23, 2013, Hayes filed a Motion For Downward Departure And Variance (docket no. 92) and a well-drafted Sentencing Brief (docket no. 93) in which he raised several issues, including a cutting-edge issue on the methamphetamine Guidelines. For reasons only known to the prosecution, the government chose not to file a written resistance to Hayes's Motion.

At the sentencing hearing, Hayes moved for a downward departure and variance. He argued that there was an over-representation of criminal history, and asked that I decline to qualify the reckless use of firearm with bodily injury (PSR ¶¶ 20, 26) and the burglary offense (PSR ¶ 34) as predicate offenses. Next, Hayes argued that the application of the Career Offender enhancement overstates the seriousness of Hayes's criminal record, his risk of reoffending, and his culpability in relation to his federal offense. Hayes contended that the use of methamphetamine weight overstates the seriousness of Hayes's offense and his risk of reoffending. The prosecution made a motion for downward departure based on substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. After oral arguments and Hayes's allocution, I sentenced Hayes. This opinion explains and amplifies one of the rationales for my sentence. Many issues were covered at the sentencing hearing, but this opinion is limited to the issue of the methamphetamine Guidelines.

B. Arguments Of The Parties

Hayes requests that I vary down from the applicable Guidelines range, based on the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and policy disagreements with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5), because U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5) yields an excessive sentence. Hayes argues that I should not rely on U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5) and the PSR's weight of 38.1 grams of actual methamphetamine to determine Hayes's Guidelines sentence because the Commission strayed from its institutional role in crafting § 2D1.1(c)(5) and the Guidelines fail to promote the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Hayes examines the increase in Guidelines ranges for methamphetamine offenses over time, highlighting the manner in which the Commission drifted from its institutional role. Hayes asserts that his Guidelines range would have been 46-57 months in 1987 and it has increased roughly 360% to his current Guidelines range of 168-210 months. Defendant's Brief at 28. Hayes, in an especially well-crafted brief, argues that the methamphetamine Guidelines should be given less deference than Guidelines that were properly crafted with empirical data and institutional expertise. Next, Hayes asserts that the methamphetamine Guidelines fail to promote the goals of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because they have a strong potential to overstate the seriousness of a defendant's record and risk of reoffending, resulting in unwarranted sentencing disparities.

I viewed the prosecution's failure to file a resistance to Hayes's Motion For Downward Departure And Variance (docket no. 92) as a waiver to argument on the methamphetamine Guidelines issue. See N.D. IA. L.R. Rule 7(f) ("If no timely resistance to a motion is filed, the motion may be granted without notice. If a party does not intend to resist a motion, the party is encouraged to file a statement indicating the motion will not be resisted."). However, I still allowed the prosecution to present arguments at the sentencing hearing. I considered the prosecution's arguments, none of which were remotely persuasive, and I determined that the prosecution's position did not undermine the powerful rationale articulated by Judge Gleeson in United States v. Ysidro Diaz, No. 11-CR-00821-2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Sentencing Methodology

Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gall, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated the methodology for determining a defendant's sentence as follows:

The district court should begin "by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range." "[T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark [, but] [t]he Guidelines are not the only consideration[.]" The district judge should allow "both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, " and then should "consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party."

United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) ( en banc ).

The Supreme Court has recognized that a party's argument for a sentence outside the calculated Guidelines range may "take either of two forms." Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007). A party may "argue within the Guidelines' framework, for a departure, " id. (emphasis in original), or a party may "argue that, independent of the Guidelines, application of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warrants a [different] sentence."[2] Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that, while "similar factors may justify either a variance or a traditional departure, " United States v. Woods, 670 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2012), district courts are not limited by the Guidelines' departure policy framework when determining whether and by what extent to vary, see United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2009) ("The judge is cabined, but also liberated, by the § 3553(a) factors.").[3]

As a matter of procedure, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that district courts should "continue to engage in the three-step process of first ascertaining the applicable Guidelines range, then considering any permissible departures within the Guidelines' structure, and finally, deciding whether a non-Guidelines sentence would be more appropriate under the circumstances pursuant to § 3553(a)." See United States v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2008).

Although "a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness when conducting substantive review of a sentence within the advisory range, the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply.'" United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 351). The Supreme Court has emphasized this point, noting "[o]ur cases do not allow a sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable, " and that "[t]he Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable." Nelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890, 892 (2009) ( per curiam ) (emphasis in the original).

As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also explained, "[w]e may not require "extraordinary' circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines." Feemster, 572 F.3d at 462 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). Instead, the district court:

must "make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented." [ Gall , 552 U.S. at 50.] If the court concludes that a sentence outside of the Guidelines range is warranted, then it must "consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance." Id. "[A] major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one." Id. After the district court determines the "appropriate sentence, " it must then "adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing." Id.

Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461.

At sentencing, my first step was to determine the advisory Guidelines range for Hayes. Second, I determined whether any traditional (non-substantial assistance) departures, either upward or downward, were warranted. Third, I considered whether to vary from the advisory Guidelines range based on my independent obligation to apply the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including any policy disagreements. I recognized that I may not rely on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors sentencing factors to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum required by statute, even when the prosecution has filed and I grant a substantial assistance motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). See United States v. Madison, 585 F.3d 412, 413 (8th Cir. 2009). However, in cases like this one, where the Guidelines range exceeds the mandatory minimum, I may first consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to reduce a defendant's sentence. Depending on the strength of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, this may include down to, but not below, the mandatory minimum. See United States v. Coyle, 506 F.3d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 2007). Then, if I grant the prosecution's motion for downward departure, I may go below the mandatory minimum, but only by applying the U.S.S.G. factors contained in § 5K1.1. Finally, I decided the prosecution's motion for downward departure based on Hayes's substantial assistance.

B. Policy Disagreement With The Methamphetamine Guidelines

In this section, I discuss my policy disagreement with the Guidelines range for methamphetamine offenses.

1. Background on policy disagreement based variances

Sentencing judges may impose sentences that vary from the Guidelines range based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 263-67 (2009) ( per curiam) ; United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007). The Supreme Court held in Kimbrough that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 "does not require... sentencing courts... to adhere to the 100-to-1 ratio for crack cocaine quantitates other than those that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum sentences." In discussing grounds for a variance from the Guidelines "[i]n Kimbrough, the Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a district court to vary from the Guidelines based on its policy disagreement concerning the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences." United States v. Battiest, 553 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-111). Thus, "policy disagreements" may provide the basis for a variance from a Guidelines sentence, even in a "mine-run" case. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109-110.

The Supreme Court clarified the issue of the district court's authority to vary from Guidelines sentences in Spears, which also involved the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences. In Spears, the Court explained that "a guideline may be rejected on categorical, policy grounds, even in a mine-run case, and not simply based on an individualized determination that it yields an excessive sentence in a particular case." United States v. Beiermann, 599 F.Supp.2d 1087 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (citing Spears, 555 U.S. at 262).

The powerful implication of Spears is that, in other mine-run' situations, the sentencing court may also reject Guidelines provisions on categorical, policy grounds- particularly when those Guidelines provisions "do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role, " id. (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 89)-and may, consequently, adopt some other well-reasoned basis for sentencing. A number of federal courts of appeals have held that Kimbrough and Spears apply to policy disagreements with Guidelines other than those applicable to crack cocaine. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding "district courts may vary from the child pornography Guidelines, § 2G2.2, based on a policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case."); United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 599-600 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that while sentencing court has authority to vary from advisory Guidelines range based on its policy disagreement, when it does so it must provide "a reasoned, coherent, and sufficiently compelling explanation of the basis for [its] disagreement.") (quoting United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) ( en banc ) ("We understand Kimbrough and Spears to mean that district judges are at liberty to reject any Guidelines on policy grounds-though they must act reasonably when using that power."); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("As the Supreme Court strongly suggested in Kimbrough, a district court may vary from the Guidelines range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines, even where that disagreement applies to a wide class of offenders or offenses."); United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[ Kimbrough ] makes plain that a sentencing court can deviate from the Guidelines based on general policy considerations.").

For the reasons discussed below, I join the few federal judges who have expressed a disagreement with the methamphetamine Guidelines. Judge Bataillon of the District of Nebraska has recognized the flaws in the methamphetamine Guidelines in a series of opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 556 F.Supp.2d 1002, 1016 (D. Neb. 2008) (varying downward in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine case and holding that "[a] variance is appropriate in view of the fact that the Guidelines at issue were developed pursuant to statutory directive and not based on empirical evidence."); In United States v. Hubel, 625 F.Supp.2d 845, 853 (2008), Judge Bataillon analyzes the flawed creation of the methamphetamine Guidelines:

For policy reasons, and to conform to statutory mandatory minimum sentences, the Commission did not employ its characteristic empirical approach when setting the Guidelines ranges for drug offenses. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 567; Fifteen-Year Assessment at 15, 72-73. Instead, the Commission attempted "to accommodate and, to the extent possible, rationalize mandatory minimum provisions established by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act" by anchoring the Guidelines to the mandatory minimum sentences. United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (August 1991), accessed at www. ussc. gov/reports. htm (hereinafter, "Mand.Min.Rep't"), Summary at ii; Rep't at 17 n. 58.
The Commission thus adopted "the 1986 [Anti-Drug-Abuse] Act's weight-driven scheme." Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 567; see Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 461, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (stating that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provided for mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of various controlled substances according to a "market-oriented" approach, creating a penalty scheme intended to punish large-volume drug traffickers severely). "The 1986 Act uses the weight of the drugs involved in the offense as the sole proxy to identify major' and serious' dealers." FN1 Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 567. The resulting Guidelines ranges for drug trafficking offenses are driven by the quantity of drugs, and keyed to statutory mandatory minimum sentences based on weight. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 594 & n. 2; Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 291-92, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996) (noting that in spite of "incongruities between the Guidelines and the mandatory sentencing statute, " the Commission developed Guidelines to parallel the mandatory minimum sentences set out in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), using the quantities and sentences derived from the statute and "[t]he weight ranges reflect the Commission's assessment of equivalent culpability among defendants who traffic in different types of drugs...").
FN1. Although both the mandatory minimum statutes and the Guidelines calibrate punishment of drug traffickers according to quantity, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that mandatory minimum sentences are both structurally and functionally at odds with sentencing guidelines and the goals the Guidelines seek to achieve, noting that "the guidelines produce a system of finely calibrated sentences with proportional increases whereas the mandatory minimums result in cliffs.'" Neal, 516 U.S. at 291, 116 Sc.D. 763 (1996). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has continued to affirm the scheme, leaving it to Congress to correct its disparities. Id.; United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 764, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997).
Noting that larger drug dealers were subject to a mandatory minimum of ten years for a first offense and twenty years for a subsequent conviction for the same offense, the Sentencing Commission stated that "[the Act] sought to cover mid-level players in the drug distribution chain by providing a mandatory minimum penalty of five years." Id. at 10. Later, in "[p]erhaps the most far-reaching provision of the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, " Congress made the mandatory minimum penalties that were previously applicable to substantive distribution and importation/exportation offenses apply also to conspiracies to commit those substantive offenses, increasing "the potential that the applicable penalties could apply equally to the major dealer and the mid- or low-level participant." Id. at 10.

United States v. Hubel, 625 F.Supp.2d 845, 849-51 (D. Neb. 2008). In support of his under-the-guidelines sentence, Judge Bataillon discusses the problems with the methamphetamine Guidelines' approach:

The court has considered the Sentencing Guidelines, but, because they were promulgated pursuant to Congressional directive rather than by application of the Sentencing Commission's unique area of expertise, the court affords them less deference than it would to empirically-grounded Guidelines. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 574-75. The Guidelines' quantity-driven, "market-oriented" approach is not a proxy for culpability in every case, nor does it always correlate to the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Drug quantity is only an accurate measure when it corresponds to a defendant's position in the typical hierarchy that characterizes most drug conspiracies. Where the defendant falls in this hierarchy is an important factor in the court's assessment of a defendant's ultimate culpability. Although the quantity-based system was designed to punish bigger distributors more harshly, charging practices and the government's control over the number and amount of controlled buys from undercover or cooperating agents can result in an erroneous impression that a long-term, small-quantity distributor is a large-quantity distributor.

Id. at 853. This position is consistent with Judge Bataillon's long-standing disagreement with the methamphetamine Guidelines on policy grounds. See United States v. Woody, 2010 WL 2884918, *10 (D. Neb. July 20, 2010) (affording less deference to the methamphetamine Guidelines range since it was "promulgated pursuant to Congressional directive rather than by application of the Sentencing Commission's unique area of expertise" and varying downward where quantity does not accurately reflect culpability); United States v. Ortega, 2010 WL 1994870 (D. Neb. May 17, 2010) (recognizing the "guidelines for methamphetamine crimes were anchored to mandatory minimum sentences, not based on empirical study" and finding an outside-the-guidelines sentence necessary to reflect defendant's minor role in a methamphetamine conspiracy and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity); United States v. Ninchelser, 2009 WL 872441 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2009) (sentencing below the Guidelines because the "the drug offense Guidelines were promulgated pursuant to Congressional directive rather than by application of the Sentencing Commission's unique area of expertise" and concluding that the quantity-based approach is "not always a trustworthy measure of the culpability of an individual defendant"); United States v. Castellanos, 2008 WL 5423858 (D. Neb. December 29, 2008) (granting defendant's motion for downward departure and concluding that the methamphetamine Guidelines should be afforded less deference since they are not empirically-grounded); United State v. Rocha, 2008 WL 2949242 (D. Neb. 2008) (finding that the methamphetamine Guidelines are not empirically-grounded and granting defendant's downward ...


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