Submitted: February 9, 2015.
Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - El Dorado.
For United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee: Jonathan Dean Ross, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of Arkansas, Texarkana, AR.
For Quinton D. Manning, Defendant - Appellant: Bruce Eddy, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fayetteville, AR.
Quinton D. Manning, Defendant - Appellant, Pro se, Forrest City, AR.
Before LOKEN, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Quinton Manning was arrested in El Dorado, Arkansas, and charged with failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, part of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The district court denied Manning's motion to dismiss the indictment. Manning entered a conditional guilty plea and now appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss, raising frequently-litigated constitutional and statutory issues. Reviewing de novo, we affirm.
Enacted in 2006, SORNA provides for the registration of a sex offender --defined as " an individual who was convicted of a sex offense" -- and requires that every jurisdiction maintain a sex offender registry. 42 U.S.C. § § 16911(1), 16912. Manning's prior sex offense was a March 1997 sexual assault conviction in Texas. The conviction required him to register as a sex offender in Texas after his release. SORNA requires a sex offender to register in each jurisdiction where he or she resides and update the registration within three business days of a " change in name, residence, employment, or student status." 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) and (c). Manning failed to register in Arkansas when he moved there in late 2010 or early 2011. SORNA provides that a sex offender who travels in interstate commerce and knowingly fails to register shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). That is the offense Manning is appealing.
SORNA did not clarify whether its registration requirements apply to sex offenders such as Manning whose sex offense convictions were prior to SORNA's enactment. Rather, SORNA gave the Attorney General " the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders." 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).
A. On appeal, Manning raises two constitutional issues that are controlled by prior Eighth Circuit decisions. First, he argues that delegating to the Attorney General the legislative power to determine the individuals to whom SORNA applies violates the constitutional nondelgation doctrine that is " rooted in the principle of separation of powers." United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 919 (8th Cir. 2013). We rejected this contention in Kuehl, like all circuits that have considered the issue. Id. at 920. Second, he argues that SORNA violates the Commerce Clause as construed by the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2587-91, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012). A panel of this court recently ruled that SORNA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, repeatedly upheld prior to this recent decision, remains intact. United States v. Anderson, 771 F.3d 1064, 1069-70
(8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1575, 191 L.Ed.2d 657 (2015); accord United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ...