from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Dennis J.
plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari with the district court,
claiming the city had acted illegally and unconstitutionally
by declaring her dog to be vicious and dangerous. The
district court annulled the writ, and the plaintiff appealed.
C. McCleary, Des Moines, for appellant.
Jessica Dawn Spoden, Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
action originated after Heather Hildreth's dog was
determined to be a "dangerous dog" by the City of
Des Moines and impounded by the Animal Rescue League.
Hildreth filed a writ of certiorari claiming the city had
acted illegally and unconstitutionally by declaring the dog
dangerous and vicious. On February 20, 2015, the district
court rejected Hildreth's claims, annulling the writ and
rescinding the previous stay of the order to euthanize. In
this appeal, Hildreth challenges the merits of the certiorari
Standard of Review.
applicable to appeals in ordinary actions govern our review
of an appeal from a district court's judgment in a
certiorari proceeding. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412; see
O'Malley v. Gundermann, 618 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Iowa
2000). "Our review is limited to correction of errors at
law, and we are bound by the findings of the district court
if supported by substantial evidence."
O'Malley, 618 N.W.2d at 290.
appeal, Hildreth raises numerous issues that were not decided
by the district court in its ruling on the petition for writ
of certiorari, namely, whether the three-day window to appeal
the determination a dog is vicious is unduly burdensome;
whether the taking of Hildreth's dog was a seizure of
property in violation of the Fourth Amendment; whether an
administrative hearing between a citizen and the city, heard
by a city employee, involves a conflict of interest violating
the citizen's right to due process; whether Hildreth had
a Sixth Amendment right to counsel because a violation of the
citations could result in thirty days' incarceration;
whether the city ordinance defining "dangerous
animals" is constitutionally defective because it fails
to take into account if the animal was provoked when it acted
in the prohibited manner; whether the city ordinance defining
"dangerous animals" is unconstitutional due to
being vague or overbroad; whether the city's euthanizing
of the dog was done without a statutory provision; whether
breed-specific ordinances are unconstitutional; whether
interfering in the relationship between a pet owner and the
pet is cruel and unusual, violating article 1, section 17 of
the Iowa Constitution; whether discovery should be allowed
prior to a city hearing; and whether sanctions were
appropriate in this case for various named
as we can tell, none of the aforementioned claims are
properly before this court for our review. See Lamasters
v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) ("It is a
fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court
before we will decide them on appeal." (citation
omitted)). Moreover, Hildreth failed to include a proper
statement in her brief explaining how any of these
arguments were preserved, which violates Iowa Rule of
Appellate Procedure 6.903(2)(g)(1). Rule 6.903(2)(g)(1)
The argument section shall be structured so that each issue
raised on appeal is addressed in a separately numbered
division. Each division shall include . . .: A statement
addressing how the issue was preserved for appellate review,
with references to the ...