December 21, 2016
CASEY LEE PINEGAR, Applicant-Appellant,
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E.
Lee Pinegar appeals the denial of his postconviction-relief
Mason of J.L. Mason Law, P.L.L.C., Ankeny, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
Lee Pinegar appeals the district court's denial of his
postconviction-relief (PCR) application following
trial. Our review is de novo. See Nguyen v.
State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 2016).
first alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to produce Christine Chase to testify at trial on
Pinegar's behalf and appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to claim the same on appeal. In the case
underlying Pinegar's PCR application, Pinegar was
convicted following a jury trial of delivery of
methamphetamine. See Pinegar, 2013 WL 5229766, at
*1. At trial, Trevor Terry was a key witness for the State,
who testified Pinegar gave him approximately two grams of
methamphetamine. Id. Pinegar alleges Chase's
testimony was required to cast doubt on Terry's
testimony; specifically, Pinegar claims Chase would have
testified she had been using drugs with Terry on the day of
the alleged delivery. In its thorough decision, the district
court gave exhaustive consideration to trial counsel's
election not to call Chase as a witness, finding Chase first
appeared as a possible witness after trial had
commenced;Chase appeared to be on drugs at the time
she appeared in court; and by the time counsel was aware
Chase was willing to testify and had informed the district
court, Chase was in jail for domestic abuse assault causing
injury, which raised self-incrimination concerns in the event
Chase was called to testify and required consultation with
her counsel before she could testify. Further, Chase was not
produced as a witness at the PCR trial; thus, the PCR court
could only speculate-based on the testimony of Pinegar-what
Chase's testimony might have been. On our de novo review,
we affirm the holding of the district court.
next alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
appeal the district court's failure to instruct the jury
that possession is a lesser-included offense for delivery.
Again, we affirm the PCR court's comprehensive
consideration of this issue, finding neither a breach of duty
nor prejudice. See State v. Grady, 215 N.W.2d 213,
214 (Iowa 1974); State v. Allen, No. 05-0832, 2006
WL 782473, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006).
Pinegar claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for
declining to argue the district court erred in allowing a
jury instruction on expert witness testimony. Pinegar claims
the instruction was erroneous-as the State provided no notice
that expert testimony would be given and the instruction
served to reinforce certain testimony by police officers that
Pinegar alleges was impermissible-but does not claim the
instruction misstated the law or contradicted another
instruction. We affirm the PCR court's determination
that, even were this instruction improper, Pinegar has failed
to show prejudice. See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d
185, 197 (Iowa 2008).
affirm without further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R.
 The facts underlying this action were
previously summarized by this court and are not restated
herein. See State v. Pinegar, No. 12-1671, 2013 WL
5229766, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2013).
 We note Pinegar testified he told his
counsel about Chase before trial at their first meeting;
notably, counsel was appointed within a month of trial.
Pinegar's counsel was unable to remember when he
discussed Chase with Pinegar. We give weight to the PCR
court's findings concerning witness credibility. See
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa
 In his appellate briefing, Pinegar
also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in his
investigation and in failing to request a continuance to
secure Chase's testimony. We note Pinegar's counsel
testified he met four times with Pinegar prior to trial, they
discussed possible witnesses and the risk and benefits of
calling them, the decision not to call Chase was made jointly
with Pinegar, and Pinegar refused to waive his speedy trial
right, which inhibited Pinegar's counsel's ability to
investigate or seek a continuance. Insofar as this claim was
considered by the PCR court and thus is preserved for our
review, see Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537
(Iowa 2002), we affirm.