December 21, 2016
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF YOUNG B. HUH AND VERONICA A. HUH Upon the Petition of YOUNG B. HUH, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, And Concerning VERONICA A. HUH, Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Paul L. Macek,
parties appeal the economic provisions of the decree
dissolving their marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
D. McKenrick of Cartee & McKenrick, P.C., Davenport, for
B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C.,
West Des Moines, for appellee/cross-appellant.
by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
appeal concerns the economic terms of the decree dissolving
the marriage of Young and Veronica Huh, whose marital estate
exceeds $7 million.Young appeals the district court's
valuation of two properties; the provisions for spousal,
child, and medical support; and the requirement he maintain
life insurance for Veronica. In her cross-appeal, Veronica
seeks to increase the support ordered and asserts the court
should have granted relief on her claim Young dissipated
assets. We amend the decree to incorporate the parties'
agreed-upon modifications, reduce Young's life-insurance
obligation, and affirm in all other aspects.
Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
parties met when Young was a gastroenterology fellow at the
University of Pittsburgh and Veronica was working as a
full-time pharmacist in New York. After they married in 1994,
Veronica worked part time as a pharmacist in Pittsburgh. When
their oldest child, C.H., was born in 1995, the parties
agreed Veronica would stay home as a full-time mother and
homemaker; she has not been employed since then. The parties
also have two younger children, H.H. and E.H.
completed his fellowship in 1996; thereafter, the parties
moved for Young's employment-two years in New Jersey,
followed by three years in Rockford, Illinois. In September
2001, the family moved to the Quad Cities, and Young entered
into his present medical practice.
moving to Iowa, the family discovered C.H. had special needs;
although he was two years ahead of his peers academically, he
had difficulty with social interactions. Veronica researched
supportive educational programs and discovered a school in
Reno, Nevada. The family agreed C.H. would complete high
school in Reno. The original plan for Veronica's parents
to live with C.H. in Nevada became impractical due to their
health issues. Instead, Veronica started a household in
Nevada, and all three children moved with her. The
parties' next oldest child, H.H., is also academically
gifted but has faced mental-health issues. The youngest
child, E.H., does not have special needs and will reach the
age of majority in six years.
and the children returned to Iowa for school breaks and
summer vacations. During the school year, Young would fly to
Nevada, usually every weekend he was not on call. After C.H.
graduated from high school in May 2014, Veronica and the
children returned to Iowa, planning to remain here. But in
June 2014, when Young told Veronica he wanted a divorce, she
and the children returned to Nevada. At the time of the June
2015 dissolution trial, the parties were both in their early
fifties. The children were ages eighteen, sixteen, and
twelve; C.H. was entering his sophomore year in college. The
parties stipulated to the value of their debt-free
homes-$323, 881 (Iowa) and $268, 502 (Nevada). The court
entered its decree on September 24, 2015. Both parties
appeal. We review their claims de novo. See Iowa R.
App. P. 6.907.
Division of Property
parties accumulated a sizable marital estate and stipulated
to the value and distribution of some assets. The district
court valued the other assets and awarded property valued at
more than $3, 700, 000 to Veronica and at more than $3, 500,
000 to Young. Although cognizant of the difference in
Veronica's favor, the court declined to order an
equalization payment, reasoning: "Young will continue to
automatically build equity in Gastro Real Estate, L.L.C. at
the rate of over $80, 000 per year. In about two years,
Young's side of the ledger will easily equal
Veronica's and then surpass it."
parties have agreed to modifications on appeal. When we add those
changes, worth approximately $113, 000, to Young's award,
he receives more than $3, 600, 000 in marital property. Young
does not seek an equalization payment on appeal, instead
challenging Veronica's need for spousal support. We turn
to Young's valuation challenges.
Real Estate L.L.C-Hartford, Connecticut.
the marriage, the parties bought commercial rental properties
and held them in limited liability companies with ownership
split equally. Because Veronica managed the properties, Young
did not know the intricacies of the rentals. In 2006, the
parties purchased their Connecticut property for $418, 000.
At the time of trial the property was leased to two tenants,
but the lower level had been vacant in the past. Young did
not know how long the new tenant had been renting and
acknowledged Veronica would know more about the specific
expert testimony was provided on valuation. Young testified
the current value was $545, 400-a 3% annual increase over the
ownership period. Veronica believed the property was worth
between $418, 000 and $450, 000. She explained the rental
history, issues with delinquent rent, the fluctuating values
of commercial real estate in that area, and why she believed
the appropriate value remained at the purchase price. In
valuing the property at $418, 000, the district court noted,
"Veronica managed the property and is more familiar with
its fair market value." The court believed Young's
opinion as to a percentage increase was "mere conjecture
appeal, Young asks us to increase the value of this property.
Young's own testimony established Veronica was more
knowledgeable about the real estate. We accept the district
court's valuation, which is within the range of the
credible evidence. See In re Marriage of Decker, 666
N.W.2d 175, 180 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003) (deferring to district
court when valuations were accompanied by "supporting
credibility findings or corroborating evidence.").
invested in various mineral interests. On appeal, he
challenges the district court's valuation of FSH
Midstream, L.L.C. at $202, 500, twice Young's original
investment. Relying on evidence presented by Young, the court
adopted the valuations made by manager Troy W. Eckard for all
five mineral investments. According to Eckard, Young owns a
"limited and indirect ownership of a LLC Unit" and
Midstream "is successfully making income and performing
as expected." Eckard explained Midstream made a
distribution each year that covered Young's tax
liabilities for this investment.
complains the district court did not apply the 25% to 35%
marketability discount Eckard said "may" apply, and
Young seeks a reduction in the property's value by
applying the discount. We note Eckard also clarified he could
provide a better estimate of the asset's value in the
future. The district court's valuation was
within the range of the evidence; we affirm. See id.
asserts Young's cash withdrawals ($126, 000), stock sales
resulting in losses ($17, 274), and costs relating to his
newly leased Porsche ($32, 182) constitute dissipation of
assets. She claims Young's actions "established
[his] intent to hide, deplete, and/or divert marital
making a property distribution, "it is proper for the
court to consider a person's dissipation of assets."
In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa
2005). We consider "whether the alleged purpose of the
expenditure is supported by the evidence, and if so . . .
whether that purpose amounts to dissipation under the
circumstances." See In re Marriage of Fennelly,
737 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Iowa 2007) (citation omitted). The court
found Young's actions were more for "control"
as opposed to dissipation. Noting Young's attorney fees
"approach $300, 000, " the court found any
"dissipation" was caused by "the tenacity of
the parties in litigating this matter" and concluded
Young did not dissipate assets. We evaluate each of
Veronica's claims in turn.
the parties separated, Young made a series of cash
withdrawals over six weeks, all in the amount of $9000,
totaling $126, 000. The district court found Young's
pattern of withdrawals "in amounts just below the
federal reporting requirement for cash transactions strongly
suggests a motive to, at a minimum, hide this asset or to
give a colorable and untraceable argument that some of the
money simply evaporated in the form of living expenses."
The court also found while Young paid his Iowa attorneys $27,
000 in cash, it was "highly skeptical" Young spent
the remainder of the cash on unspecified "living
expenses, " even though Young claimed only $75, 000
remained. Finding Young had accounted for only $27, 000 of
the withdrawals, the court deducted that amount from $126,
000 and credited Young with $99, 000 in cash. Because the
district court awarded the unaccounted-for cash to Young in
its distribution of property, we find no need to further
modify the division of assets.
address Young's sale of equities. On August 7, 2014,
Young sold five equity positions in the parties' joint
brokerage for more than $173, 000, transferring the proceeds
into an account in his name, resulting in a loss of $17, 274
to the parties. Like the district court, we conclude
"the stock losses were attributable to market forces as
opposed to an intentional waste of assets."
we consider Veronica's claim Young's lease of a
Porsche constitutes dissipation of $32, 000. Young's
employer deducted that expense from his distributions. One of
the factors in identifying dissipation is whether an outlay
by one spouse was atypical of the expenditures made by the
parties before the breakdown of the marriage. See In re
Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2013).
Assuming without deciding that leasing the Porsche
constituted dissipation, we decline to modify the decree on
this ground. Veronica is receiving more assets, and Young is
not requesting an equalization payment. Applying $32, 000 to
the property distribution would result in Young forgoing a
smaller equalization payment. Accordingly, we conclude
Veronica is not entitled to relief on her dissipation claim.
summarize, we adopt the parties' agreed-upon
modifications, uphold the district court's property
valuations, and reject Veronica's dissipation claim. As a
result, Young's distribution tops $3, 600, 000 and
Veronica receives more than $3, 700, 000 in marital property.
primary objection to the decree centers on the alimony award
of $13, 000 per month. Alimony, or more formally spousal
support, "is a stipend to a spouse in lieu of the other
spouse's legal obligation for support." See In
re Marriage of Tzortzoudakis, 507 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa
Ct. App.1993). Contrary to Young's position, we conclude
the district court achieved equity in the alimony award.
district court determined Young's annual income from his
medical practice was $600, 000. The court reached that figure by
averaging Young's employment income from his 2011 to 2013
tax returns, noting 2014 was an aberration given the stress
of the dissolution and Young electing not to be on call.
Young claims the court should have set his income at $585,
000. Upon our de novo review, we agree with the district
court that Young's "annual W-2 income in the future
will be $600, 000."
other hand, the district court opined Veronica was unable to
secure meaningful employment given her poor health and time
out of the workforce. Veronica testified she started having
"joint swelling, and stiffness, and tiredness" when
their youngest child was two years old, so the parties hired
a full-time nanny. Veronica sought medical treatment for her
symptoms in 2007, seven years before the dissolution trial.
Her treating doctor diagnosed an undifferentiated connective
tissue disorder and prescribed medications. Veronica's
symptoms improved for the first two years she lived in Reno,
but worsened with the stress of the divorce. Veronica
testified she could not work all day at any job where she
could not rest.
supported Veronica's need for treatment during the
marriage. But during the dissolution, he offered opinions
from two doctors, who examined only her medical records, that
she did not meet the criteria for a rheumatological disease.
Young claims Veronica could earn $121, 000 per year as a
pharmacist. But Veronica has not worked as a pharmacist since
1995-instead devoting her time to the three children and the
court believed Veronica's testimony that her
"activities are limited by the symptoms of her disorder.
Whether these symptoms are caused by a physical disorder or
are exclusively psychological matters little. Again, the
symptoms existed before any breakdown in the marriage, and
Young assisted her in obtaining care." The court found
the diagnosis by Veronica's treating physician was more
persuasive than Young's experts, who did only a record
we decide the issues anew, we give weight to the factual
findings of the district court. See In re Marriage of
McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). We must
"pay very close attention" to the district
court's credibility assessment because we necessarily
forfeit "the impression created by the demeanor of each
and every witness as the testimony is presented."
See In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423
(Iowa 1984); see also Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 101.
Like the district court, we credit Veronica's testimony
and the diagnosis of her treating physician in concluding her
health issues constrain her ability to return to the
Amount of Support.
district court found "it is infeasible [Veronica] will
become self-supporting from employment income." The
court noted an application of the guidelines in In re
Marriage of Gust to Young's $600, 000 annual income
would support an alimony award of $15, 000 per month or $180,
000 per year. See 858 N.W.2d 402, 416 n.2 (Iowa
2015) ("While clearly not binding on an Iowa court, the
. . . guidelines nonetheless provide a useful reality check
with respect to an award of traditional spousal
support."). Using the statutory factors and noting the
Huh marriage lasted nearly twenty-one years, the court
awarded Veronica traditional spousal support of $13, 000 per
month, or $156, 000 per year, until either party died or
Veronica remarried. The court reasoned Young could pay
alimony, child support, and his own $14, 000 in monthly
expenses from his earned income and still have around $3000
per month in earned income to save or spend. Finally, the
court recognized Young's child-support obligation will
end in approximately six years, thereby increasing his
ability to pay alimony from his earned income.
appeal, Young compares this case to In re Marriage of
Mauer, where the court ordered a husband earning $1,
000, 000 per year to pay the homemaker spouse $12, 600 per
month until she reached age sixty-six and six months and to
then pay a reduced amount. See 874 N.W.2d 103,
111-12 (Iowa 2016) (clarifying Iowa's statutory factors
control over the Gust formula). But precedent is of
little value because the decision to award spousal support
and the determination of the amount are based on the unique
circumstances of each case. See Olson, 705 N.W.2d at
315. The Mauer court's resolution was
based on the situation of those parties. See 874
N.W.2d at 111.
Young argues even if Veronica cannot return to work, she does
not need alimony because she has sufficient income to meet
her needs from the commercial real estate yield and the
return on her investments. We consider the property
settlement in evaluating the alimony award. See In re
Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa Ct. App.
a chart using a 4% return on assets, Young claims with the
alimony award, Veronica will have $100, 000 more in
disposable income then he will have. Young asserts his chart
shows "the inequitable and punitive nature" of the
court's decision. We reject his assertion.
Young's chart to be misleading. He lists income from her
properties,  but he fails to include his $246, 000
annual income from Gastro Holdings. Each year, Young will
receive $100, 000 more from his property than Veronica will
receive from her properties. We also find fault with
Young's chart concerning the parties' returns on
their investments. Without explaining the investment totals
he used, Young asserts his annual investment income is $19,
404 and Veronica's return is $32, 926. Our calculations
show Young received $1, 119, 000 in investments, which at 4%
will provide $45, 000 each year. Meanwhile, Veronica's
$876, 000 in investments will provide $35, 000 per year.
Young's chart does not mention retirement assets. At 4%
annual earnings, Young's $525, 000 in retirement accounts
will grow by $21, 000 annually, even if he stops
contributing. In contrast, Veronica's $65, 000 in
retirement accounts will grow by $2600 per year, and she will
not have an opportunity to increase the balance through
conclude Young has the ability to pay $13, 000 in monthly
alimony-as well as his child support. See
Tzortzoudakis, 507 N.W.2d at 186 (stating "the
ability of the one spouse to pay should be balanced against
the needs of the other spouse"). Young's property
and investments, excluding retirement accounts, will provide
over $100, 000 more income to him each year than Veronica
receives from her property and investments. His retirement
assets also surpass Veronica's retirement assets, and
Young has the ability and earnings to shelter additional
contributions, Veronica does not. Thus, the parties'
unearned income does not lead us to conclude, as Young does,
that no alimony is necessary. See Gust, 858 N.W.2d
at 411 ("Following a marriage of long duration, we have
affirmed awards both of alimony and substantially equal
property distribution, especially where the disparity in
earning capacity has been great.").
final challenge to spousal support, Young claims the court
inflated the parties' lifestyle and ignored
Veronica's "actual needs." Young proposes
Veronica "needs" only $10, 000 per month in spousal
support. Young's counsel repeated this assertion during
measure "need" objectively by what is required for
a "spouse to become self-sufficient at a standard of
living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during
the marriage." Id. (emphasis added). We
focus "on the earning capability of the spouses, not
necessarily on actual income." See id. As
discussed above, Veronica's earning capacity is $0 and
Young's earning capacity is $600, 000 per year. Given
Veronica's health issues, the parties' substantial
disparity in earning capacity will continue post-divorce.
Veronica will need to provide her own medical insurance,
while Young's employer pays for his medical insurance. In
analyzing the parties' lifestyle, the court found:
This lifestyle included making investments without the
necessity of financing. Virtually every physical need of this
family was addressed without any significant concern for
cost. The freedom this allowed the family in making any given
choice is a lifestyle that was enjoyed by Veronica. The
lifestyle did not involve squandering money; the lifestyle
allowed building capital in significant amounts. On average,
the parties were able to accumulate over $350, 000 for each
year of marriage.
See id. (stating objective standard for need is
"based upon the pre-divorce experience and private
decisions of the parties, not on some externally discovered
and imposed approach to need, such as subsistence or adequate
living standards"). We afford the district court
considerable latitude in determining spousal support and will
amend the award only where the court has failed to do equity.
Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 315. Here, we conclude equity
requires us to uphold the order of $13, 000 per month in
spousal support to Veronica.
the parties agree the decree should be modified to grant
Veronica both tax dependency deductions, and we modify
to Iowa's guidelines for child support, parties with a
combined monthly net income of $25, 000 have a combined $3624
support obligation for two children and $2598 for one child.
See Iowa Ct. R. 9.26. Because Veronica and
Young's combined monthly net income exceeds $25,
000, the guidelines place their support obligation
"within the sound discretion of the court . . . but
shall not be less than" the support obligation for a
combined monthly net income of $25, 000. See Iowa
Ct. R. 9.26(3).
court found Young had a net monthly income of $41,
000. The court found Veronica would receive
$9000 in net monthly income from her commercial real
estate. Those net monthly income figures yielded
the court's ratio of 82% from Young and 18% from
Veronica. Applying Young's 82% to the
two-child minimum payment of $3624, the court found
Young's minimum support for H.H. and E.H. was $2962 per
month. Based on the family's past spending on special
programming for their children, the court found Veronica
would pay around $5000 per month on mentors, tutors, camps,
and lessons for H.H. and E.H. Using its discretion, the court
ordered Young to pay $2000 of that amount, with Veronica
bearing the other $3000 of those costs. Thus, Young pays
$4962 per month to support two children and $3123 per month
when only one child is eligible for support.
attacks the court's 82:18 ratio of his income to
Veronica's income. Because Veronica will not have earned
income and Young's post-divorce annual income will be
higher than $500, 000, we reject Young's proposed ratio
of 59% for him and 41 % for Veronica. We also reject
Veronica's summary proposal that we increase Young's
child support to $7962 per month for two children. See
Midwest Auto. III, LLC. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp.,
646 N.W.2d 417, 431 n.2 (Iowa 2002) (holding random mention
of an issue without elaboration or supporting authority fails
to preserve the claim for appellate review). In his reply
brief, Young makes a new proposal, asserting a 70% to 30%
ratio is appropriate. Because we do not accept Young's
calculations, we decline to change the ratio.
also asks us to eliminate the discretionary addition of $2000
for two children and $1000 for one child, contending these
sums are "not based in reality." After our de novo
review of the record, we agree with the court's
assessment that the middle child has special needs that call
for a continued investment of the family's resources.
Further, we agree with the court's explanation:
In respect to the children's education and all other
aspects of learning, the parties spared virtually no expense.
This is what makes this fact pattern unique. The proposition
of setting up and maintaining two separate households many
hundred miles apart is a testament to how focused the parties
were on the success of the children. Not only did this
require a large expenditure of money, but it also required a
large expenditure of psychological and emotional capital.
Veronica estimates that she will spend $5000 per month, or
$60, 000 per year, on [the minor children's] education.
The court finds that this is a fact. She will leave no stone
exercising its discretion, the district court was mindful of
the proposition that child support "may reflect the
standard of living the child would have enjoyed had there not
been a dissolution." In re Marriage of Powell,
474 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). Based on the unique facts of
this marriage, we conclude the child support set by the
district court is a reasonable and necessary amount.
parties challenge the court's award of medical support.
We uphold the court's 90% to 10% ratio for uncovered
medical expenses. Young holds $64, 000 in a health savings
account and received assets with higher yields; Veronica does
not have a health savings account and received assets with
lower yields. We interpret Young's testimony as agreeing
to provide medical insurance for the children through college
and modify the decree accordingly. We reject Veronica's
assertion Young also should contribute toward uncovered
medical expenses until each child finishes college. During
oral arguments, Veronica's counsel cited no authority for
such a requirement, and we find Young's testimony did not
encompass this extra obligation.
Veronica and the children "would hardly be
destitute" upon Young's premature death, the court
nevertheless decided his death would severely impact their
lifestyle and ordered Young to maintain life insurance with
death benefits payable to Veronica for $1, 500, 000 as long
as a child-support obligation exists, and after that in the
amount of $1, 000, 000 until Veronica reaches age sixty-six.
Then Young was to maintain $400, 000 in favor of Veronica
"until alimony is no longer due."
challenges the requirement he maintain life insurance,
pointing out his alimony obligation terminates upon his death
and his cumulative child-support obligation is around $250,
000. Veronica does not dispute this calculation. Young
asserts equity requires any insurance requirement be limited
"to the total child-support obligation secured less
social security survivor benefits and decreasing as the
obligation decreases." See In re Marriage of
Mouw, 561 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (stating
an order requiring life insurance "should be limited to
the amount necessary to secure an obligation").
spouse may be required to maintain life insurance for the
benefit of the other spouse in a dissolution decree.
Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 318. When such insurance
secures spousal support, which normally ends upon the death
of either party, courts require "some significant reason
for imposing such a requirement, " such as "some
demonstrated need to provide funds beyond the obligor's
death." See, e.g., In re Marriage of Weber, No.
98-1688, 2000 WL 278535, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 15,
2000). Generally, life insurance secures alimony when the
parties have a minimal marital estate and thus need is
demonstrated. See In re Marriage of Debler, 459
N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1990) (ordering husband to maintain
insurance where the beneficiary-homemaker spouse received
only $21, 000 in property). Because Veronica received more
than $3, 700, 000 in property, we modify the decree and
eliminate the requirement Young secure his alimony obligation
with life insurance.
Young's six-year obligation to pay child support is
another matter.Equity requires Young to maintain $500,
000 of life insurance in favor of Veronica until his
obligation to pay child support ends.
decree shall be amended to reflect the modifications agreed
to by the parties. Young's 401(k) is valued at $470, 338;
his interest in Gastro Holdings is valued at $462, 051. Young
is awarded a checking account valued at $10, 757. Veronica
shall be allowed to claim both children as dependents for
state and federal income tax purposes. Young shall provide
medical insurance for the children through college. In
addition, we strike the provision requiring Young to maintain
life insurance to cover his spousal-support obligation. We
modify and order Young to maintain $500, 000 of life
insurance in favor of Veronica until his obligation to pay
child support ends. In all other respects, the district
court's insightful and well-reasoned dissolution decree
 The parties settled the issues of
custody and visitation in the State of Nevada; Veronica was
granted physical care of the children.
 Veronica's award included the debt
assigned to her. Young had no debt.
 These issues could have been resolved
in a post-trial motion, but Young filed his appeal on the
same day the dissolution decree was entered, depriving the
district court of jurisdiction. We modify Young's 401(k)
to $470, 338 in value. We also modify to award Young a
checking account valued at $10, 757. Finally, we modify the
value of Young's interest in Gastro Holdings to $462,
 Eckard's valuation for the June
2015 trial provided:
A caveat provided in [the $202, 500 Midstream
valuation] is that such an investment has not been appraised
by third-party's internal assumption by the managing
member. It should also be noted the Manager [Eckard] owns a
significant interest in [Midstream]. The full and potential
estimated value would be best noted after two to three full
operating years by the company, which would be in 2016 or
2017. It also would require the asset to have a four-year
time frame in order to recognize value relative to
distributions and continued operational success.
 Bank records show Young moved over
$600, 000 out of joint accounts and into his own accounts in
August 2014. Exhibit 10 lists the parties' assets on May
31, 2014, the month before Young told Veronica he wanted a
divorce, and again on May 31, 2015. During that one-year
period, the parties sustained a net loss of $296, 000. In
briefing and during oral argument, counsel for Veronica
claimed that but for Young's dissipation of assets, the
court would have had $300, 000 to $400, 000 more to
distribute and sought an equalization payment on appeal. The
record and testimony show both parties transferred assets
between numerous accounts before trial. Like the district
court, we find "Veronica did not identify any specific
 Young has practiced his
gastroenterology specialty in the Quad Cities since 2001 as a
one-fourth shareholder and employee of Gastroenterology
Associates, P.C. As an employee, in addition to a base
salary, Young is paid for performing administrative duties
and receives quarterly bonuses based on his productivity, one
factor being the number of procedures he performs.
Additionally, his employer pays for the lease payments on his
car, his car insurance, six weeks of vacation, $2500 in
professional dues, and his family health insurance.
 Iowa Code section 598.21A(1) (2013)
provides the court should consider all of the following
factors in determining spousal support: a. The length of the
b. The age and physical and emotional health of the
c. The distribution of property . . . .
d. The educational level of each party at the time of
marriage and at the time the action is commenced.
e. The earning capacity of the party seeking
maintenance, including educational background, training,
employment skills, work experience, length of absence from
the job market, responsibilities for children under either an
award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party to find appropriate employment.
f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance
becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the
length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
g. The tax consequences to each party. . . . .
j. Other factors the court may determine to be
relevant in an individual case.
 Veronica will be fifty-six when the
youngest child leaves for college.
 For example, Carol Mauer was healthy
and had an earning capacity of $25, 000 per year, while
Veronica's poor health leaves her without an earning
capacity. See 874 N.W.2d at 111-12. Further, Carol
Mauer received $855, 000 in retirement assets and was
"eligible to draw social security benefits based on her
own prior employment." Id. at 110 n.2, 112. By
contrast, Veronica received $65, 000 in retirement assets,
while Young received $530, 000, and Veronica will not earn
additional retirement benefits in the future.
 Young misstates the amount as $155,
878. As the district court noted in the decree, the correct
amount is $145, 000.
 When the additional payment of $80,
000 from Gastro Real Estate commences in around two years,
Young will receive $180, 000 more from his properties
each succeeding year.
 On her cross-appeal, Veronica
summarily asserts the court's $13, 000 alimony award was
too low; she sought over $20, 000 per month at trial. Because
she provides no rationale for increasing the award, we
decline to do so.
 Adding Young's earned income of
$600, 000 to his approximately $246, 000 in investment income
from Gastro Holdings results in $846, 000 gross annual
income. At a tax rate of 40%, Young will pay $338, 400 in
taxes, leaving $507, 600 net annual income, or $42, 300
monthly income, which the court rounded down to $41,
 The court found Veronica's
commercial property would yield $145, 000 per year. Taking
Veronica's $145, 000 annual yield times the 28% tax
bracket for incomes between $91, 000 and $190, 000 results in
Veronica's tax of $40, 600. When Veronica's tax is
deducted from her $145, 000 annual yield, she has $104, 400
net annual income, or $8700 net monthly income. The court
rounded this up to $9000.
 The court also stated: "Neither
net income calculation considers alimony." We decline
Young's request to include alimony in the calculation of
 The court also ordered Young to pay
a portion of his oldest child's current college