from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Marlita A.
Hall appeals the denial of his motion to set aside his
L. Hall, El Reno, Oklahoma, pro se appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
Hall never directly appealed his 1993 drug convictions or
initiated a postconviction-relief proceeding. But in December
2015, Hall filed a "Motion to Correct Criminal Record,
" citing Iowa Code section 692.5 (2015), in which he
requested that his "criminal record" be "set
aside." This assertion was based on what he claims to be
newly discovered evidence he obtained in July 2015- namely,
his birth certificate, which shows his birthdate to be March
27, 1955. His juvenile and criminal records indicate a
birthdate of March 5, 1955.
The district court denied Hall's motion. Its order
[Hall] filed a motion to correct the birth date in this case
to March 27, 1955, and provided a copy of a birth certificate
in support of his motion. The date of birth he claims the
court relied on in this case was March 5, 1955. The court
finds the record should be corrected to reflect [Hall]'s
date of birth is March 27, 1955, and this portion of
[Hall]'s motion is granted.
[Hall]'s motion also claims the underlying conviction
should be overturned because his date of birth is off by less
than 20 days. The court finds this mistake, if it was a
mistake, did not affect the result in his case. Further, this
is not newly discovered evidence as it has been available
since March of 1955 when [Hall] was born. [Hall]'s
request to overturn his conviction on this basis is denied.
appeals. He argues the district court correctly ordered
correction of his criminal records to reflect his true birth
date but erred in holding the birth certificate was not newly
discovered evidence and refusing to set aside his convictions
or sentences. The State moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing,
among other things, that the district court and this court
have no jurisdiction because Hall's motion was filed more
than twenty years after his convictions became final. The
supreme court ordered the State's motion to dismiss be
submitted with the appeal and transferred the matter to this
court on February 8, 2017.
district court lacked jurisdiction over Hall's motion.
See Iowa Code § 814.6(1); Iowa R. App. P.
6.103(1); State v. Olsen, 794 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa
2011) (holding the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider untimely motion filed after the entry of judgment in
a criminal case); State v. Braun, 460 N.W.2d 454,
455 (Iowa 1990) (explaining the district court was without
jurisdiction over application filed in a closed criminal case
and stating "[a] defendant cannot jump-start an expired
case by simply filing an application for collateral
relief"). Additionally, we lack jurisdiction over this
appeal. Final judgments were entered on Hall's
convictions more than two decades ago. Hall's act of
filing a posttrial motion years later does not revive the
time to appeal from the final judgments and create appellate
jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist. See
Olsen, 794 N.W.2d at 289 ("A timely appeal is
jurisdictional, and the time limit for appeal cannot be
extended by filing an improper posttrial motion. An untimely
posttrial motion is defective and does not toll the running
of the thirty-day period within which an appeal must be
we were to construe Hall's motion as an application for
new trial under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(8)
based on newly discovered evidence, discovery of Hall's
birth certificate cannot in any way be construed as such. A
new trial may be granted based on newly discovered evidence
when the evidence "could not have been discovered
earlier in the exercise of due diligence." Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.24(2)(b)(8). Although Hall may not have discovered the
true date of his birth until 2015 when he obtained a copy of
his birth certificate, the birth certificate has been in
existence since 1955. Furthermore, in order to warrant a new
trial, the newly discovered evidence must be material to the
conviction at issue. See id. Hall's birthdate
was not in any way material to his convictions. In any event,
the motion was untimely since it was filed more than two
years after final judgment. See id.
even if we were to somehow construe Hall's motion as an
application for postconviction relief, it is time-barred
because Hall filed it more than three years after his
convictions were final. See Iowa Code § 822.3.
Hall's birth certificate was in existence at the time of
his convictions, and therefore, it is not newly ...