from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, Richard D.
appeals from sentencing order requiring him to register as a
sex offender. VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.
A. Kuehner of Eggert, Erb, Mulcahy & Kuehner, P.L.L.C.,
Charles City, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.
Rigel challenges the district court's sentencing order
requiring him to register as a sex offender for a
"sexually motivated" crime pursuant to Iowa Code
section 692A.126 (2011). Because we find the court abused its
sentencing discretion in determining from the facts admitted
in the record that Rigel's crime was sexually motivated,
we vacate the portion of the sentence requiring him to
register as a sex offender and remand.
Facts and Proceedings.
April 23, 2013, Rigel was charged with third-degree sexual
abuse, a class "C" felony, in violation of Iowa
Code section 709.4, for an incident involving a minor, K.M.,
on November 19, 2012. The State subsequently amended the
charge to assault without intent to inflict serious injury
but causing serious injury, a class "D" felony.
See Iowa Code §§ 708.1, .2(4).
appeared before the district court on May 19, 2015, to enter
a guilty plea to the amended charge. The following exchange
took place during the plea hearing:
THE COURT: As amended this is what the State alleges you did.
The State alleges that on or about November 19, 2012, within
the confines of Chickasaw County, Iowa, you did commit an
assault without the intent to inflict a serious injury, but
that you did cause a serious injury. This is what the State
would have to be able to establish by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) that on or about November 19, 2012, you
did an act which was intended to cause pain or injury to or
which was intended to result in physical contact which would
be insulting or offensive to another person coupled with the
apparent ability to execute that act. The act was committed
against a child, a young person by the initials K.M., (2)
that you did not have the intent to inflict a serious injury,
but your actions caused a serious injury. A serious injury in
this case is defined as being a disabling mental illness. I
have had a chance to read the minutes of evidence, to skim
over the minutes of evidence, Mr. Rigel, as to what allegedly
occurred between you and this young person. I know that
you're disputing the original charge of sexual abuse
third, but nonetheless, are you willing to admit that based
on the existing minutes of evidence, that a reasonable jury
could find you guilty of Assault Without Intent to Inflict a
Serious Injury, but which caused a serious injury?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Based on the minutes then, I find that there is a
factual basis for the guilty plea. No other factual basis was
sentencing hearing occurred on March 22, 2016. At sentencing,
Rigel's counsel and the court disagreed as to what Rigel
admitted as part of his plea.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . But we do have an objection to the
official version listed in the pre-sentence investigation
because it contains facts that were not admitted to at the
plea change hearing.
THE COURT: My understanding is the defendant entered an
Alford plea; is that correct? Or did he-
THE COURT: -enter a plea?
[PROSECUTOR]: No, it was an Alford plea, Your
THE COURT: So what facts would he have admitted to?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I think, when you do an
Alford plea, the only facts that the court can take
note of in the file are ones that support the elements of the
charge. Anything over and above the basic elements of the
charge he's entering a plea to are not admitted in the
Alford plea proceeding.
THE COURT: Well, I would want to read the transcript of those
proceedings to find out if [the plea-hearing court] asked him
whether he could rely upon the minutes of ...