from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J.
Jackson White appeals the court's grant of the
State's motion for summary judgment on his
postconviction-relief application. AFFIRMED.
Matthew C. Moore of Law Offices of Matthew C. Moore,
Chariton, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
MULLINS, Presiding Judge.
2009, Robert Jackson White was convicted of possession with
intent to deliver as an habitual offender following a jury
trial. His conviction was upheld on appeal. See State v.
White, No. 09-1463, 2011 WL 227587, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 20, 2011). In October 2015, White filed a
postconviction-relief (PCR) application. The State filed a
motion for summary judgment, contending White's
application was time barred under Iowa Code section 822.3
(2015) (providing all PCR actions "must be filed within
three years from the date the conviction or decision is final
or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of
procedendo is issued"). Following a hearing on the
motion, the PCR court granted the State's motion and
dismissed White's claims. On appeal, White pursues only
one of the claims he asserted below-that State v.
Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2015) (addressing the
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement), constitutes new law and creates a genuine issue
of material fact for trial on his PCR
application. Our review is for correction of errors of
law. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519
concedes his application is outside of the three-year window
provided by section 822.3. He argues, however, the statute of
limitations does not apply because the Iowa Supreme
Court's holding in Gaskins constitutes "a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within
the applicable time period." Iowa Code § 822.3. As
to this claim, the PCR court ruled:
[White] also claims that State v. Gaskins is new law
and therefore an exception to the statute of limitations as
well. However, Gaskins specifically dealt with a
search incident to arrest. A review of [White]'s criminal
case indicates that the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement for search and seizures would apply.
Gaskins does not provide an exception to the statute
contends Gaskins substantially altered the landscape
of the law under the Iowa Constitution with regard to
searches incident to arrest. Even assuming we agree with
White's contention, see Dixon v. State, No.
16-0329, 2017 WL 1278294, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017)
(noting Gaskins "overruled extant
precedent"); see also Nguyen v. State, 829
N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2013) (finding the exception applies
where a ground of law "had been clearly and repeatedly
rejected by controlling precedent from the court with final
decision-making authority" and thus "could not have
been raised" as the claim had no "possibility of
success" and was "viewed as fruitless at the time
but became meritorious later" as a result of the change
in law (citation omitted)), White must still show the new
ground of law "would [a]ffect the validity of the
conviction, " State v. Edman, 444 N.W.2d 103,
106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); see also Dixon v. State,
No. 12-0499, 2013 WL 3291837, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 26,
appeal, White simply contends a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether Gaskins applies or could
be applied to his case. But White has not identified a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability of
the automobile exception or even argued that it does not
apply. Instead, White asserts a special concurrence written
in Gaskin supports that the majority's ruling in
Gaskin might apply not only to searches incident to
arrest but also to the automobile exception. See
Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 35-38 (Appel, J., concurring).
Despite this concurrence, the automobile exception remains
good law, and "[w]e are not at liberty to overrule
controlling supreme court precedent." State v.
Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). As a
result, White has failed to "show a nexus between his
conviction and the [purported] change in law, such that it
would affect the validity of his conviction."
Dixon, 2013 WL 3291837, at *3.