from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley
J. Harris, Judge.
Gunter appeals after entering pleas of guilty to
second-degree burglary and domestic-abuse assault, second
C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
to a plea agreement,  Justin Gunter entered an Alford
to the charges of burglary in the second degree and
domestic-abuse assault causing bodily injury, second offense.
On appeal, Gunter contends he was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel because there is no basis upon which a
factfinder could find he had the specific intent to commit an
assault and, consequently, no factual basis supports his plea
to second-degree burglary.
review constitutional claims, such as ineffective assistance
of counsel, de novo. See State v. Schminkey, 597
N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). To prove ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted.
Id. "Where a factual basis for a charge does
not exist, and trial counsel allows the defendant to plead
guilty anyway, counsel has failed to perform an essential
duty." Id.; see also State v.
Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) (finding
insufficient basis to show the three shots fired constituted
separate and distinct acts supporting three counts of
intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent and
remanding to "give the State the opportunity to
establish a factual basis").
consider the entire record before the district court in
analyzing whether there is a factual basis for the plea.
See Gines, 844 N.W.2d at 441.
The factual basis must be contained in the record, and the
record, as a whole, must disclose facts to satisfy all
elements of the offense. A factual basis can be discerned
from four sources: (1) inquiry of the defendant, (2) inquiry
of the prosecutor, (3) examination of the presentence report,
and (4) minutes of evidence. Moreover, we have held the
record does not need to show the totality of evidence
necessary to support a guilty conviction, but it need only
demonstrate facts that support the offense. . . . [W]e need
only "be satisfied that the facts support the
State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Iowa 2010)
district court informed Gunter that to convict him on the
burglary charge, the State would have to prove that "on
or about March 27th, 2016, here in Black Hawk County, with
the intent to commit an assault and having no right to do so,
you entered into an occupied structure."
"is seldom capable of being established by direct
evidence." Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at 789. But
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that Gunter
entered the complaining witness's residence with the
intent to commit an assault. At the time of the offense there
was an active protective order prohibiting Gunter from
contacting the complaining witness, who is the mother of his
child. On March 27, 2016, the complaining witness believed
Gunter was in jail for an earlier assault upon her. She
answered a knock on her door to find Gunter at the door. She
turned and ran to her bedroom and tried to close the door.
Gunter followed her into her bedroom, pushing the door open.
Gunter struggled with her and pushed the complaining witness
onto the bed; she suffered scrapes and bruises from the
encounter. Gunter grabbed their two-year-old child and ran
from the residence.
contends that since the assault did not occur until after the
argument there was no basis to conclude he had the intent to
assault the complaining witness upon entry of the apartment.
However, there is no evidence that the complaining witness
consented to Gunter's entry, and she ran to a bedroom
with Gunter apparently in hot pursuit as she was unable to
close the bedroom door before Gunter pushed it open. The
record provides sufficient circumstantial proof that Gunter
entered the premises with an ...