from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott,
Gochett appeals his guilty plea.
C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Elisabeth S. Reynoldson,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Goodhue,
Gochett pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
third offense (marijuana) and eluding. The district court
immediately sentenced him to prison terms not exceeding five
years and two years respectively, ordered the sentences to be
served consecutively for a total prison term not exceeding
seven years, and ordered the payment of fines "plus
surcharge" but suspended the fines due to Gochett's
appeal, Gochett argues (1) his plea attorney was ineffective
in permitting him to plead guilty without ensuring he was
properly advised of the maximum and minimum penalties for the
offenses and (2) the district court erred in "ordering
[him] to pay court costs imposed on charges that were
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement."
"[R]ule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires the court to inform the
defendant of the 'mandatory minimum punishment' and
the 'maximum possible punishment' before accepting a
guilty plea." State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676,
685 (Iowa 2016). Gochett contends the district court failed
to discuss "any mandatory minimum fines" and
"failed to mention any surcharges."
did not preserve error on this challenge by filing a motion
in arrest of judgment. This omission would be forgiven if the
district court had neglected to advise him of the
consequences of failing to file the motion. See id.
at 680. In fact, the district court advised Gochett that his
request for immediate sentencing would result in a waiver of
his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment challenging
the plea and he would "be forever barred from filing a
motion in arrest of judgment and forever attacking this
guilty plea." This advice amounted to substantial
compliance with Rule 2.8(2)(d). See Fisher, 877
N.W.2d at 681 (noting court has "found sufficient
compliance" when court advised defendant "his right
to 'question the legality of his plea of guilty'
would be 'gone'" (quoting State v.
Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 692 (Iowa 1981))). Because
Gochett did not file a motion in arrest of judgment after
being advised of the consequences of this omission, he failed
to preserve error, and he must raise the issue under an
ineffective-assistance of counsel rubric. See id. at
generally preserve ineffective assistance claims for
postconviction relief to allow defense counsel to defend the
charge. See State v. Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 319
(Iowa 2015). But where the record is adequate, we will
address the claims on direct appeal. Id. Gochett
asserts the record is adequate to address the issue. We
Code section 911.1(3) (2015) states "[w]hen a fine or
forfeiture is suspended in whole or in part, the court shall
reduce the surcharge in proportion to the amount
suspended." The district court suspended a $750 fine and
a $625 fine and checked a box indicating those fines were
suspended "due to defendant's incarceration."
But the court separately imposed a D.A.R.E.
and a law enforcement initiative surcharge and said nothing
about suspending these surcharges. In a colloquy with
Gochett, the district court did not inform Gochett of any of
State concedes "the prosecutor and the trial court
neglected to inform [Gochett] of the surcharges that could be
imposed." Assuming without deciding Gochett's
attorney breached an essential duty in failing to bring this
omission to the ...