from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jeffrey
L. Harris (suppression) and James D. Coil (sentencing),
District Associate Judges.
defendant appeals her conviction for operating while
intoxicated, first offense. AFFIRMED.
J. Kucera, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
Hudson police officer initiated a traffic stop after
conducting a license plate check that showed the
seventy-seven-year-old registered owner of the vehicle had an
expired driver's license. As the officer approached the
vehicle, he was able to determine the driver was not the
registered owner based upon the younger age of the driver.
The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Lara Welch, the
registered owner's daughter. Although the officer
determined the driver of the vehicle was not the registered
owner, he engaged with the driver, developed reasonable
suspicion the driver was intoxicated, and ultimately arrested
the driver for operating while intoxicated.
was charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense.
Welch moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the stop,
contending the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to
continue the traffic stop after determining Welch was not the
registered owner of the vehicle. The district court denied
the motion to suppress, relying on State v. Jackson,
315 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1982). Welch subsequently pleaded
guilty, thereby waiving any challenge to her motion to
suppress. See State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641
(Iowa 2009) ("It is well established that a
defendant's guilty plea waives all defenses and
objections which are not intrinsic to the plea."). Welch
timely filed this appeal.
Welch filed this appeal, the supreme court decided State
v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 2017). In that case,
the court held "that under the search and seizure
provision of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution,
[a traffic] stop must end when reasonable suspicion is no
longer present." Coleman, 890 N.W.2d at 285. In
reaching that holding, the court overruled Jackson.
See id. at 301 ("As indicated above, it is not
clear whether Jackson was a Fourth Amendment or
article I, section 8 case. In any event, to the extent that
Jackson is inconsistent with our holding today, we
overrule it."). Coleman was a substantial
change in our search and seizure law. As noted by Justice
Until today, a police officer who lawfully stopped a motorist
could ask to see his or her driver's license, especially
when the officer knew the driver was not the car's
registered owner. Almost all Iowans, I believe, would find
this activity completely unobjectionable and, indeed,
mundane. But not the majority. Instead, our court has
determined that this act of routine traffic enforcement
violates the search and seizure provision of the Iowa
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court reached the
opposite conclusion under the Fourth Amendment in 2015.
See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615
To get to its result, the majority overrules another one of
our established search and seizure precedents. In State
v. Jackson, we correctly decided a quarter century ago
that the constitution does not require an officer who
lawfully stops a vehicle to "treat the [driver] as if he
had never seen him." 315 N.W.2d at 767. Rather, after
dispelling the original purpose for the stop, the officer
could perform the minimally intrusive step of checking the
driver's license, which Iowa drivers are required by
statute to carry and display upon an officer's request.
Id.; see also Iowa Code § 321.174(3) (2013)
("A licensee shall have the licensee's driver's
license in immediate possession at all times when operating a
motor vehicle and shall display the same upon demand of a . .
. peace officer . . . ."). I would affirm Mr.
Coleman's conviction for driving while barred by
following our commonsense decision in Jackson and
United States Supreme Court precedent explicitly allowing
officers to check the driver's license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance as part of the routine
mission of any traffic stop.
Id. at 301-02 (Waterman, J., dissenting).
now contends her trial counsel was ineffective for allowing
her to plead guilty and waive her suppression challenge. We
can "resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal only if the record is
adequate." State v. Toles, 885 N.W.2d 407, 408
(Iowa 2016). While we have strong doubt Welch would be able
to prove her counsel was ineffective in allowing Welch to
plead guilty and thereby waive a challenge to previously
unassailable case law, she should be able to establish a
record relating to her claim under the circumstances
presented. We therefore affirm the defendant's conviction
and preserve her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for postconviction-relief proceedings. See State v.