from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
applicant appeals from the district court's summary
dismissal of his second application for postconviction
R. Gravett of Oliver Gravett Law Firm, P.C., Windsor Heights,
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
Anderson appeals from the district court's summary
dismissal of his second application for postconviction relief
(PCR). Following a jury trial, on November 8, 2005, Anderson
was convicted of burglary in the first degree and sexual
abuse in the second degree. Anderson filed a direct appeal
from his conviction, claiming the district court had wrongly
refused to give him a new trial after the primary witness
recanted her testimony. A panel of our court affirmed
Anderson's conviction. See State v. Anderson,
No. 06-1212, 2007 WL 750561, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 14,
2007). Procedendo issued on April 30, 2007.
then filed his first application for PCR. He raised a number
of ways in which he claimed trial counsel and direct appeal
counsel were ineffective in their representation of him. The
district court denied Anderson's application in its
entirety, and Anderson appealed. A panel of our court
affirmed the district court's denial of his application.
See Anderson v. State, No. 10-0182, 2010 WL 5394782,
at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2010).
filed his second application for PCR-the application at issue
here-on January 23, 2012. The State filed a motion to dismiss
approximately four years later, on January 18, 2016. The
State maintained Anderson's second application was
time-barred because the statute of limitations had run as of
April 29, 2010. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2011)
(requiring all applications to "be filed within three
years from the date the conviction or decision is final or,
in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of
procedendo is issued"). On May 19, 2016, Anderson filed
a motion for leave to amend his application. The supplemental
application asserted a number of ineffective-assistance
claims and that there were material facts not previously
presented that required vacation of Anderson's
conviction. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d).
Specifically, Anderson claimed (1) the victim had recanted
her allegations, (2) the victim was pressured into her
initial testimony by law enforcement and the prosecuting
attorney, and (3) the victim had withheld information
regarding his occupancy in the premises he was convicted of
unlawfully entering and he had new evidence to establish his
right and title to the premises. Anderson did not assert that
his second application- filed almost five years after
procedendo issued on his direct appeal-met the exception to
the three-year limit because it involved "fact or law
that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period." See id. § 822.3.
24, 2016, the district court granted the State's motion
to dismiss, stating:
98 or 99 percent of all the matters in the pro se application
and the amendment of May 19, 2016, were previously dealt with
by the trial court, the appellate court on direct appeal, the
trial court on the first postconviction relief application
and the appellate court on the appeal of the first
. . . .
Defendant is well outside the three-year statute of
limitations permitted to file his claim. Additionally, the
claims have been previously litigated.
maintains the district court erred when it granted the
State's motion for summary dismissal of his application.
He focuses his claim on the "new evidence"
involving his right, title, and equitable interest in the
occupancy of the premises he was alleged to have unlawfully
entered. Additionally, he claims he should have been allowed
to develop his ineffective-assistance claims. We review the
district court's summary dismissal of ...