from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie K.
appeals from his sentences for two counts of sexual abuse in
the second degree and one count of indecent exposure; he also
challenges the no-contact order that was entered by the
district court. SENTENCE AFFIRMED; WRIT SUSTAINED.
C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
Standlee entered Alford pleas to two counts of
sexual abuse in the second degree and one count of indecent
exposure. The court sentenced him to a term not to exceed
twenty-five years for each count of sexual abuse in the
second degree and ordered Standlee to serve the sentences
consecutively. The one-year sentence for indecent exposure
was set to run concurrently to the other sentences.
Additionally, following the sentencing hearing, the court
entered a new five-year no-contact order which listed as
protected persons the two children Standlee abused as well as
"all children under the age of eighteen years."
appeal, Standlee maintains the district court failed to state
adequate reasons on the record for imposing consecutive
sentences. He also claims the district court erred in naming
"all children under eighteen" as part of the
no-contact order. We review the sentence imposed in a
criminal case for correction of errors at law. State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). We will not
reverse "absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in
the sentencing procedure." Id.
courts should . . . explicitly state the reasons for imposing
a consecutive sentence, although in doing so the court may
rely on the same reasons for imposing a sentence of
incarceration." State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269,
275 (Iowa 2016). Here, the court stated the following:
Counts I and III in FECR 295471 shall run consecutive to each
other with a mandatory minimum of 17.5 years or 70 percent on
each count for a total period not to exceed 50 years.
The sentences in FECR 295471 are consecutive based on the
following: The separate and the serious nature of the
offenses and to provide Mr. Standlee with the maximum
incentive to comply with the terms and conditions that are
imposed upon him.
this statement by the court is "terse and succinct,
" it is also sufficient to allow our review of the
sentencing court's discretionary action. See State
v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015)
("While the rule requires a statement of reasons on the
record, a 'terse and succinct' statement may be
sufficient, 'so long as the brevity of the court's
statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the
trial court's sentencing discretion.'"). Thus,
this statement is adequate, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(3)(d) and Hill.
we consider Standlee's claim regarding the scope of the
no-contact order entered by the district court. The State
maintains Standlee may not appeal the order on direct appeal
because it is not "the defendant's final judgment of
a sentence." See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)
(2016). The State correctly concedes that we have permitted a
defendant to directly appeal a no-contact order when it was
part of the sentencing order but maintains this is not one of
those instances. Because the sentencing order is silent as to
the no-contact order and Standlee is claiming the district
court exceeded its jurisdiction, this claim should have been
raised as a certiorari action. We treat the appeal as such, and
we grant the writ. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.108;
see also Crowell v. State Pub. Def., 845 N.W.2d 676,
682 (Iowa 2014) ("When an appeal should have been filed
as a writ of certiorari, our rules of appellate procedure
authorize us to consider the appeal as though it was properly
filed as a certiorari action.").
argues, and the State concedes, that the district court
exceeded its power when it named "all children under the
age of eighteen" as protected persons. Iowa Code section
664A.1(1) limits the persons a defendant may be ordered to
have no contact with to "the alleged victim[s], persons
residing with the alleged victim[s], or members of the
alleged victim[s'] immediately family." We vacate
the no-contact order insofar as it includes "all
children under the age of eighteen." "Because the
no-contact order was not authorized by statute, " we
remand to the district court to enter a corrected order and
to determine if there are other parties who ...