IN THE INTEREST OF E.H. and Z.H., Minor Children, A.H., Mother, Appellant.
from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, Karen R. K.
Salic, District Associate Judge.
mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 232 (2016). AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Moeller of Sorensen & Moeller Law Office,
Clear Lake, for appellant mother.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Witte Kraemer,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
J. Rodriguez of Garland & Rodriguez, Garner, guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
appeals from an order terminating her parental rights in her
children, E.H. and Z.H. The juvenile court terminated
Ashley's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), (f), and (l) (2016). In her
petition on appeal, Ashley contends the State failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds
authorizing the termination of her parental rights. She also
contends the district court should have declined to terminate
her parental rights pursuant to Code section 232.116(3).
review proceedings terminating parental rights de novo."
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014) (citing
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)). The
statutory framework is well established. Pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1), the State must prove a statutory
ground authorizing the termination of a parent's rights.
See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010).
Second, pursuant to section 232.116(2), the State must prove
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the children. See id. Third, if the State has proved
both the existence of statutory harm and termination of a
parent's rights is in the best interests of the children,
the juvenile court must consider whether any countervailing
considerations set forth in section 232.116(3) should
nonetheless preclude termination of parental rights. See
id. These countervailing considerations are permissive,
not mandatory. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113.
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each
statutory ground authorizing termination of her parental
rights. Where, as here, the juvenile court terminates
parental rights pursuant to more than one statutory ground,
we may affirm the order so long as there is sufficient
evidence to support termination of parental rights pursuant
to any one ground. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707.
address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
termination of Ashley's parental rights pursuant to
section 232.116(1)(f). Pursuant to this provision, the State
is required to prove ...