from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P.
Chandler appeals his convictions following a bench trial on
the minutes of evidence.
Smith of Shawn Smith, Attorney at Law, P.L.L.C., Ames, for
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
winter night, a Des Moines police officer stopped a vehicle
driven by Daniel Chandler. The officer had "pulled him
over several times" before and knew "he was on a
temporary restricted license, that he was supposed to have an
Intoxilyzer in his vehicle, and that he was supposed to have
a work permit if he was driving a vehicle." She also
knew he worked for a lawn care company. The officer saw a
passenger in the vehicle. She checked Chandler's license,
instructed him to step out of the vehicle, and searched him.
The search uncovered marijuana. Chandler scuffled with the
officer before being handcuffed and arrested.
was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled
substance (third offense) as an habitual offender and
interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury.
See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(5), 719.1(1)(e),
902.8 (2015). He moved to suppress the evidence gained in the
search on the ground that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle. The district court denied the
agreed to a trial on the minutes of evidence. The minutes
made reference to his prior convictions. The district court
found Chandler guilty and imposed the sentencing
appeal, Chandler argues the district court (1) should have
granted his motion to suppress, (2) made successive findings
of guilt in violation of constitutional double jeopardy
provisions, and (3) should have required greater proof of his
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution require
reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for investigatory
purposes. See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct.
1683, 1687 (2014); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767,
774 (Iowa 2011). The State must show "the stopping
officer had specific and articulable facts, which taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, to
reasonably believe criminal activity may have occurred."
State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004);
accord Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24
(2000). "Mere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of criminal
activity is not enough." Tague, 676 N.W.2d at
204; accord Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 ("The
officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch"' of
criminal activity." (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968))).
contends the officer lacked "'specific and
articulable facts' to believe that [he] was not properly
operating his vehicle pursuant to the restrictions imposed
upon him by nature of his temporary restricted license"
and she acted with "no more than a simple
'hunch' that [he] may have been violating the terms
of his temporary restricted license." On our de novo
review of this constitutional issue, we disagree.
[C]arrying a passenger, on a Sunday evening at 10:30 p.m. in
the wintertime when Chandler's employment was potentially
with a landscaping company forms a reasonable basis that
Chandler was not driving his vehicle home from work and thus
[was] violating the terms of his [temporary restricted