from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Kim M.
Riley, District Associate Judge.
Faber appeals the district court's denial of his
challenge to the timeliness of the State's filing of the
Moore of Mid-Iowa Mediation & Law, P.L.L.C., Ames, for
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
Faber was the driver of a vehicle involved in an automobile
accident in which he was seriously injured in October 2015. A
police officer dispatched to the scene determined Faber had
been drinking. Faber was transported to a hospital. In the
emergency room the officer read Faber the operating while
intoxicated (OWI) implied consent advisory. Faber refused to
answer questions without an attorney present. The officer
asked for blood, breath, and urine samples, which Faber
refused. Faber asked the officer to leave the hospital room,
but the officer declined and then "told him he was being
charged with OWI" and other charges. The officer did not
issue written citations at the hospital, and Faber was
transported to another hospital by air ambulance. Faber
subsequently had a long period of rehabilitation for the
injuries suffered in the accident.
March 3, 2016, Faber was arrested and charged with OWI.
See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2015). A trial
information was filed Monday, April 18, 2016. Faber moved to
dismiss for failure to file a speedy indictment, arguing he
was arrested while at the hospital in October 2015, and the
April 2016 filing of the trial information was therefore
untimely or, in the alternative, the filing of the trial
information was more than forty-five days after his formal
arrest on March 3, 2016, and the application of the filing
extension under Iowa Code section 4.1(34) would violate his
due process rights. The district court overruled the motion.
After a bench trial on the minutes, Faber was convicted and
sentenced. He has appealed.
review interpretations of the speedy indictment rule for
errors at law." State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d
856, 860 (Iowa 2017). "We are bound by the findings of
fact of the district court if they are supported by
substantial evidence." State v. Wing, 791
N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 2010), overruled on other grounds
by Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 864-67. We review
constitutional due process issues de novo. See State v.
Jackson, 878 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Iowa 2016).
argues the forty-five days for the State to file the trial
information was triggered by the officer telling him at the
hospital of the officer's intent to arrest him.
Iowa's general rule is: "When an adult is arrested
for the commission of a public offense . . . and an
indictment is not found against the defendant within 45 days,
the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed . . .
." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(a). He claims he was
arrested at the hospital when the officer told Faber he
intended to arrest and charge him with OWI.
parties filed their briefs on April 27, 2017. On May 25,
2017, the supreme court filed its opinion in State v.
Williams, explaining what "arrest" now means
for purposes of the speedy indictment rule: "The rule is
triggered from the time a person is taken into custody, but
only when the arrest is completed by taking the person before
a magistrate for an initial appearance." 895 N.W.2d at
867. Any subjective belief Faber had concerning the
statements the officer made while they were both at the
hospital is of no consequence. Under the facts of this case,
the speedy indictment rule was triggered when Faber was
arrested and charged with OWI on March 3, 2016, and not
also complains his due process rights were violated when the
trial information was filed on Monday, April 18, 2016,
forty-six days after his arrest. The forty-five day rule is
among the rule provisions dictating the timing of certain
events in the progress of a criminal case. Due process under
the Iowa and United States Constitutions requires speedy
progress of criminal cases, but neither document sets forth a
specific time frame for satisfaction of due process.
See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. 1,
§ 10. Rule 2.33(2)(a) is, by its terms, a rule of
"public policy" intending to assure the timely
disposition of criminal cases. The Iowa legislature has long
declared the proper method of computing deadlines: "In
computing time, the first day shall be excluded and the last
included, unless the last falls on Sunday, in which case the
time prescribed shall be extended so as to include the whole
of the following Monday." Iowa Code § 4.1(34). The
forty-fifth day for fling the trial information was Sunday,
April 17, 2016. Faber's argument tries to elevate the
forty-five day provision of court rule 2.33(2)(a) to
constitutional stature, a stature that cannot be exceeded by
application of legislative action to compute time. He cites
no authority in support of either contention. Filing the trial
information on April 18, 2016, in compliance with Iowa Code
section 4.1(34), did not violate rule 2.33(2) and did not
violate Faber's constitutional rights to due process.