from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley
J. Harris, Judge.
defendant appeals his prison sentences and a surcharge
imposed following his convictions for robbery in the second
degree, theft in the first degree, extortion, interference
with official acts, and two counts of burglary in the third
C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
Todd received a prison sentence not to exceed thirty-five
years with a mandatory minimum of seven years as the result
of a plea bargain that encompassed six different crimes. On
appeal, Todd claims the district court abused its discretion
in honoring the parties' agreement to consecutive terms.
He contends the sentencing court concentrated too much on the
nature of the offenses and too little on the fact that he was
only eighteen years old. After reviewing the record,
find no abuse of discretion in the prison time ordered and
affirm that portion of the sentences. We vacate the
imposition of the $125 law enforcement initiative (LEI)
surcharge because it was not authorized by statute for any of
State filed a trial information in June 2016, charging Todd
with burglary in the third degree for breaking into a
Waterloo residence in late May 2016. The State filed a second
trial information in August 2016, alleging robbery in the
first degree and interference with official acts for an armed
invasion of a liquor store in late July and a struggle with
arresting police officers. The State filed a third trial
information in September 2016, alleging burglary in the third
degree for a residential break-in in late December 2015.
eve of his jury trial for first-degree robbery, Todd pleaded
guilty to a reduced charge of robbery in the second degree,
as well as first-degree theft, extortion, and interference
with official acts. Todd's agreement with the State
called for the sentences on the three felonies to run
consecutively to each other for a total of twenty-five years
with a seven-year mandatory minimum on the second-degree
robbery count. Todd also entered Alford
pleas to the two pending burglary charges. The
parties agreed those two five-year prison sentences would run
consecutively to each other and consecutively to the robbery
case. After entering his pleas, Todd told the district court
he wished to proceed to immediate sentencing.
its intent to follow the joint plea recommendation, the
district court imposed an indeterminate thirty-five-year
prison term, requiring Todd to serve seventy percent on the
ten-year robbery sentence. The court suspended several fines,
but imposed the applicable thirty-five percent surcharges, as
well as the $125 LEI surcharge. The court viewed the plea
agreement as "an appropriate resolution in this
matter" and specifically referenced Todd's age of
eighteen years. The court reasoned consecutive sentences were
proper "because of the severity of the offenses"
and "the fact that there was a Taser used in the
robbery." The court also noted the "two separate
breaking[s] into residences."
challenges only the sentences on appeal. He alleges the
district court abused its discretion by focusing "mainly
on the nature of the offenses" and not giving proper
consideration to other factors, particularly Todd's age
and the fact he had been a juvenile during the first burglary
offense. He asks us to remand for a new sentencing hearing.
We decline to do so.
sentencing appeals, we are not called to decide if we would
have settled on the same sentence that was imposed by the
district court. State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550,
554 (Iowa 2015). Rather, we exercise the more limited role of
checking if the sentence actually imposed by the district
court was unreasonable. Id. A sentence is reasonable
if it takes into account the relevant sentencing factors,
including the nature of the crime and its attending
circumstances, as well as the defendant's age, character,
propensities, and chances of reform. See State v.
August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999). A reasonable
sentence fits both the offense and the offender. Id.
State argues Todd is "precluded from arguing that the
sentencing court abused its discretion by accepting the joint
sentencing recommendation that he expressly adopted and
endorsed." We agree. When the accused reaches a plea
agreement with the State and the court incorporates the
recommendations from that agreement in its sentence, the
sentence is not "the product of the exercise of the
trial court's discretion but of the process of giving
effect to the parties' agreement." State v.
Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995) (quoting
State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983)).
We find the sentencing pronouncement gave effect to the
parties' plea agreement.
giving effect to the plea agreement, the district court also
reflected on the relevant factors motivating its sentencing
choice. The court mentioned Todd's age, but gave greater
weight to the dangerous nature of the robbery and the fact
that both burglaries were home invasions. See State v.
Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (holding
"right of an individual judge to balance the relevant
factors in determining an ...