from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine
Dalton Ploof, District Associate Judge.
juvenile appeals from her delinquency adjudication, claiming
it was not supported by substantial evidence.
Patrick J. Kelly, Bettendorf, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
juvenile, D.M., appeals her adjudication as a delinquent,
which was based on the court's findings she committed the
delinquent acts of robbery in the first degree and willful
injury resulting in bodily injury. She maintains there was
insufficient evidence to support the court's findings,
arguing there was no evidence she "intended to steal the
property of [the victim] or . . . had the intent to assault
or harm [the victim] in any way."
proceedings are special proceedings that serve as an
alternative to the criminal prosecution of a child, and we
review them de novo. In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 49
(Iowa 2013). "We presume the child is innocent of the
charges, and the State has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the delinquent
Injury Resulting in Bodily Injury. Pursuant to Iowa Code
section 232.2(12)(a) (2016), a delinquent act is "[t]he
violation of any state law or local ordinance which would
constitute a public offense if committed by an adult."
Section 708.4(2) makes it illegal to do "an act which is
not justified and which is intended to cause serious injury
to another . . . if the person causes bodily injury to
D.M. maintains there was no evidence presented at trial that
she physically participated in the "jumping" of the
victim. She is correct, but this argument ignores the
court's reliance on the principle of aiding and abetting
in making its determination D.M. had committed the delinquent
evidence presented at trial establishes that D.M., two
codefendants, and the victim were spending the evening
hanging out together in front of a local YMCA, when the two
codefendants acted together in repeatedly hitting the victim
"everywhere"-including her head-until she fell to
the ground. One of the codefendants then proceeded to stomp
on the victim's head approximately four times. As the
district court stated, "Stomping on a person's head
while they are on the ground shows an intent to cause serious
injury." See State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116,
132 (Iowa 2004) (considering "the principle that an
actor will ordinarily be viewed as intended the natural and
probable consequences that usually follow from his or her
voluntary act"); see also Iowa Code §
702.18 (defining serious injury, in part, as a bodily injury
"creat[ing] a substantial risk of death, "
"caus[ing] serious permanent disfigurement, " of
suffering "skull fractures"). Additionally, it is
undisputed the victim sustained bodily injury. See State
v. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1997) (noting the court
had adopted the Model Penal Code's definition of
"bodily injury, " which was "physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition"
victim testified that before the attack, she noticed D.M. and
the two codefendants whispering and looking at her, causing
her to feel uncomfortable and leading her to make a phone
call to her mother asking to be picked up. Within a few
minutes-before the victim's mother arrived-the first
codefendant charged at the victim and hit her. This, combined
with D.M.'s response to the assault-taking the
victim's purse and running away while the victim was
unable to stop or chase her-convinces us that D.M.
"assented to or lent continence and approval to
the" assault "by some manner encouraging it prior
to or at the time of its commission." State v.
Spates, 779 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Iowa 2010) (citation
is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's
finding that D.M. committed the delinquent act of aiding and
abetting willful injury causing bodily injury.
in the First Degree. As relevant here, pursuant to
section 711.2, "A person commits robbery in the first
degree when, while perpetrating a robbery, the person