from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink
(summary judgment) and William P. Kelly (ruling on 1.904(2)
Jackson appeals the dismissal of his third application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED. Eric W. Manning of Manning
Law Office, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for appellant.
P. Jackson Jr., Fort Madison, pro se.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
2001, Andrew Jackson was convicted of first-degree robbery,
first-degree burglary, and second-degree
kidnapping. At issue in this appeal is Jackson's
third application for postconviction relief (PCR), which was
filed in October 2015. In his application, Jackson argued his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
object to the kidnapping instruction on the ground that it
did not include the intensifying language contained in the
State v. Rich tripartite test. See 305
N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1981) (noting confinement or removal
under the kidnapping statute "must be more than slight,
inconsequential, or an incident inherent in [another crime]
so that it has a significance independent from [the other
crime]" and sufficient "confinement or removal may
exist because it substantially increases the risk of
harm to the victim, significantly lessens the risk
of detection, or significantly facilitates escape
following the consummation of the offense" (emphasis
State moved for summary dismissal on statute-of-limitations
grounds. At a subsequent hearing, Jackson argued a concurring
opinion in a recent supreme court case, State v.
Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 487-92 (Iowa 2015) (Wiggins,
J., concurring specially), amounted to a substantive change
in the law exempting him from the statute of limitations. The
district court disagreed and granted the State's motion
for summary dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds.
appeal, Jackson challenges the district court's summary
dismissal of his PCR application as
time-barred. He continues to rely upon his argument
that Robinson amounts to a substantive change in the
law exempting him from the statute of limitations. PCR
"applications must be filed within three years from the
date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of
an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is
issued." Iowa Code § 822.3 (2015). "However,
this limitation does not apply to a ground of . . . law that
could not have been raised within the applicable time
following Jackson's initial appeal issued in January
2003. Jackson did not file his third PCR application until
more than twelve years later. Rich was decided
approximately two decades before Jackson's conviction.
Any arguments flowing from that decision were obviously
available to Jackson and could have been raised within the
limitations period. Finally, we repeat our position that
"Robinson did not announce a new rule; it
merely clarified an existing rule" and
"[c]larifications of existing law do not constitute new
grounds of fact or law for PCR purposes." Brandes v.
State, No. 17-0128, 2017 WL 6517176, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 20, 2017); accord Grayson v. State, No.
15-1382, 2016 WL 6652357, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016)
("[O]ur court has previously concluded the supreme court
did not announce a new rule in Robinson but rather
only clarified existing law by its reliance upon the
three-factor test announced in State v. Rich . . .
."), further review denied (Feb. 10, 2017);
Hampton v. State, No. 15-1802, 2016 WL 2743451, at
*1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) ("[T]he
Robinson court notes that this concept
'underlies' the test set forth in Rich. . .
. In other words, the court was not announcing a new rule of
law but rather clarifying the existing law, which does not
provide an exception to the requirements of section
822.3."), further review denied (July 7, 2016).
application was untimely, and he is not exempted from the
statute of limitations. We therefore affirm the dismissal of
Jackson's PCR application.