from the Iowa District Court for Cass County.
Brooks challenges his conviction of a simple misdemeanor
C. Baxter of Wild, Baxter & Sand, P.C., Guthrie Center,
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
21, 2017, Joseph Brooks was stopped by a motor vehicle
enforcement officer and cited for a gross-weight violation
under Iowa Code section 321.463(10)(B) (2017), a simple
misdemeanor. Brooks concedes he "received a copy of the
citation." The citation provided: "Court Date: If
you must appear in court or if you choose to appear to answer
to a charge which does not require an appearance, report to
the above named court on: 07/06/2017 at 1:00
PM." The citation indicated that it did not require
attendance. A lower portion of the citation allowed for
Brooks to sign the citation to enter a plea of not guilty and
to acknowledge certain information, including notification
that his signature on the citation amounted to an agreement
that his failure to appear in person or by counsel to defend
against the offense charged could result in conviction and
judgment. Brooks did not sign the citation. Brooks did not
appear for his court date, and a conviction and judgment were
entered administratively by the clerk of court. Brooks
applied for discretionary review, which the supreme court
granted. See Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(d); Iowa R.
App. P. 6.106.
discretionary review, Brooks challenges his conviction. He
contends (1) the citing officer conducted an unlawful search
of his motor vehicle, which resulted in the citation that was
issued, and (2) he was denied due process when he was
convicted without a hearing.
initial matter, this case is plagued with procedural and
error-preservation problems. Brooks's unlawful-search
argument was neither raised in, nor decided by, the district
court. This deficiency ordinarily precludes appellate review
of a particular claim. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641
N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) ("It is a fundamental
doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be
both raised and decided by the district court before we will
decide them on appeal.").
never appeared personally or otherwise in the district court.
The only record of proceedings at the district court is the
citation and docket sheet.Specifically, no factual record was
developed in the district court as to the traffic stop. It
was Brooks's responsibility to make and provide this
court with a sufficient record to decide this appeal, which
he has failed to do. See Smith v. Iowa Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 729 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2007). We
"may not speculate as to what took place or predicate
error on such speculation." In re F.W.S., 698
N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 2005). We also decline to simply accept
Brooks's self-serving version of the events as stated in
his application for discretionary review and appellate brief,
as it is not a sufficient substitute for a trial record.
Cf. Smith, 729 N.W.2d at 827 ("The district
court's recitation of these matters in its ruling is not
a substitute for the required appellate record.").
a record to support Brooks's claim the search of his
motor vehicle was unlawful, we affirm his conviction.
See, e.g., Estes v. Progressive Classic Ins.
Co., 809 N.W.2d 111, 115-16 (Iowa 2012) ("Failure
to provide a record requires us to affirm the district
court's judgment."); Smith, 729 N.W.2d at
828 ("[W]e will not reach the merits of the . . . appeal
because it failed to provide us with a sufficient record . .
. ."); In re Marriage of Ricklefs, 726 N.W.2d
359, 362 (Iowa 2007) ("[T]he lack of record . . .
precludes us and should have precluded the court of appeals
from deciding the issue."); F.W.S., 698 N.W.2d
at 134 ("[W]e must affirm . . . because F.W.S. has
failed to present a proper record on appeal.").
the due process claim, Brooks's overarching complaint is
that he was not provided with "notice of and opportunity
to attend a hearing 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.'" He cites Iowa Code section
321.485(2) to support his argument that the absence of his
signature on the citation negates any notice he was given.
That section, however, merely provides the signing of the
citation "shall constitute a written promise to appear
as stated in the citation." Iowa Code § 321.485(2).
The statute does not say the absence of such a
signature amounts to insufficient notice of a hearing.
See id. Although Brooks did not sign the citation,
he admits he received a copy. He does not allege that he did
not read the citation or was otherwise unaware of his court
date as indicated therein. The citation expressly notified
Brooks he could "appear in person or by counsel to
defend against the offense charged" and advised him of
the date, time, and location of his court date. "The
central elements of due process are notice and an opportunity
to defend." Silva v. Emp't Appeal Bd. 547
N.W.2d 232, 234-35 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); accord Hron v.
Ryan, 164 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Iowa 1969) ("The
essentials of due process are satisfied if the notice is one
which is reasonably calculated to come to defendant's
attention and to give him an opportunity to defend the
action, if he desires to do so."). We find due process
to be satisfied in this case and affirm.