from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, John G.
Issac Fry appeals his conviction and sentence for assault
with intent to commit sexual abuse causing bodily injury.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN
PART, AND REMANDED.
C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
Issac Fry was charged with assaulting an employee of a care
center at which he stayed. Following a bench trial, the
district court found him guilty of assault with intent to
commit sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section
709.11(2) (2015). On appeal, Fry (1) challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district
court's finding of guilt and (2) argues the district
court erred in ordering him to make restitution of $25 for
court-appointed attorney fees and in requiring him to pay
Sufficiency of the Evidence
district court set forth the elements of the crime as
That on or about the 28th day of November of 2015, the
defendant assaulted the complaining witness here in this
case. An assault would be an act intending to cause pain or
injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact
which would be insulting or offensive to the other, with the
apparent ability. That the defendant did so with the specific
intent to . . . commit a sex act by force or against the will
of the complaining witness. And, finally, that the
defendant's assault caused a bodily injury to the
concedes he assaulted the employee but argues the State did
not produce "sufficient evidence to support a finding
that [his] intent was to perform a sex act by force [or]
against the will of" the employee. The district court
defined specific intent as follows:
Specific intent means not only being aware of doing an act
and doing it voluntarily, but, in addition, doing it with a
specific purpose in mind[.] [B]ecause determining the
defendant's specific intent requires the trier of fact to
decide what the defendant was thinking when the act was done,
[i]t is seldom capable of direct proof. The trier of fact
should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the
act to determine the defendant's specific intent. The
trier of fact may, but is not required to, conclude a person
intends the natural results of his acts.
court found the State proved this element:
In this case, there was a great deal of force, in the
Court's opinion, exercised by this defendant, who is
quite a bit bigger than the complaining witness. He
physically grappled, manhandled, grabbed, held this
complaining witness. At one point, his elbow struck the
complaining witness, and she sustained a bruise. These acts,
the Court believes, were specifically intended to result in
physical contact with the complaining witness, which was
insulting or offensive to her, and the crime of assault is a