from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Gregg R.
Jon Winters appeals the denial of his third application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
J. Booth of Booth Law Firm, Osceola, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
Jon Winters, carrying a long gun with a scope, broke into the
home of a woman, told her she had to leave the house with
him, removed her cell phone so she could not "call the
law, " and forced her to drive into the country. He
admitted to these acts during a police interview. He pled
guilty to second-degree kidnapping.
filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed as frivolous, and
two postconviction relief applications, which were also
resolved against him. See Winters v. State, No.
12-2011, 2014 WL 6721112, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 26,
2014). In his third postconviction relief application, he
alleged in part that his plea attorney was ineffective (1) in
failing to inform him "he did not have an absolute right
to withdraw his guilty plea" and (2) in failing to
investigate the woman's criminal history. He also claimed
his prior postconviction attorney was ineffective in failing
to raise these claims. Following a hearing, the
postconviction court denied the application. Winters
Ineffective Assistance - Failure to Inform of Absolute Right
to Withdraw Guilty Plea
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) requires a district
court to address a defendant personally about several aspects
of a plea and sentence. Rule 2.8(2)(d) states, "The
court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to a
plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea
proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment
and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude
the right to assert them on appeal."
district court complied with both parts of the rule, and
Winters does not argue otherwise. He also acknowledges his
attorney informed him of the obligation to file a motion in
arrest of judgment if he believed the district court
"screwed up" and that failure to file the motion
would prevent him from "contest[ing] the validity of the
plea on appeal." In Winters' view, his plea attorney
also should have advised him he would be unable to withdraw
his plea "if he later had 'buyer's
2.8 does not require the district court to provide this type
of advice, nor has Winters cited any authority requiring his
attorney to provide this type of advice. Notably, Winters
raised no concern about his plea before it was entered. To
the contrary, he admitted the advice his attorney gave him
was fine, his appearance at the plea proceeding was
voluntary, and the elements of the offense were satisfied.
Although he later filed a motion in arrest of judgment
claiming deposition testimony changed his view of the case,
he conceded the deposition was taken before he entered the
plea. In denying the motion, the district court reiterated
that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily with "a
full understanding" of what was discussed.
attorney more than fulfilled her duty to properly inform
Winters of the purposes and consequences of a motion in
arrest of judgment. On our de novo review, we conclude she
did not breach an essential duty in failing to further inform
him of the inability to withdraw the plea based on
buyer's remorse. See Strickland v. ...