from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van
Marel, District Associate Judge.
McCanna appeals his judgment and sentence following his
guilty plea to absence from custody.
Smith of The Smith Law Firm, PC, Ames, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
VAITHESWARAN, PRESIDING JUDGE.
McCanna signed out of a residential work release center and
did not return at the appointed time. The State charged him
with absence from custody, a serious misdemeanor.
See Iowa Code § 719.4(3) (2017). McCanna pled
guilty to the crime, and the State agreed to recommend ninety
days in jail with credit for time served and a $315.00 fine
plus costs and applicable surcharges. The sentence was to be
served consecutively to "all other cases." The
written plea agreement stated, "I understand that the
court may sentence me up to the maximum provided by the
district court accepted the plea. The court sentenced McCanna
to a jail term not exceeding one year, with credit for time
served. The court also imposed the fine and surcharge.
appeal, McCanna contends his plea attorney was ineffective
"in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment where
the district court did not allow [him] to withdraw his plea
when the court did not follow the plea agreement." We
assume without deciding this is the appropriate
framework. Although we generally preserve
ineffective-assistance claims for postconviction relief, we
find the record adequate to address the issue. See State
v. Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2015).
must establish the breach of an essential duty and prejudice.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984); State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa
2006). We will focus on the breach prong.
hangs his hat on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(4),
If, at the time the plea of guilty is tendered, the court
refuses to be bound by or rejects the plea agreement, the
court shall inform the parties of this fact, afford the
defendant the opportunity to then withdraw defendant's
plea, and advise the defendant that if persistence in a
guilty plea continues, the disposition of the case may be
less favorable to the defendant than the contemplated by the
As McCanna asserts, the rule does indeed authorize the
withdrawal of a plea. But the rule cannot be read in
isolation. See State v. Pryor, No. 16-1982, 2017 WL
2684361, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (citing
State v. Weaver, No. 05-0764, 2006 WL 3018498, at *3
(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006)). One of the rule's
subsections states in part, "[I]f the agreement is
conditioned upon concurrence of the court in the charging or
sentencing concession made by the prosecuting attorney, the
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to acceptance or rejection until receipt of a
presentence report." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(2). Another
subsection states in part:
When the plea agreement is conditioned upon the court's
concurrence, and the court accepts the plea agreement, the
court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the
judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the
plea agreement or another disposition more ...