from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R.
Fowler, District Associate Judge.
Carpenter appeals after pleading guilty to domestic abuse
J. O'Flaherty of O'Flaherty Law Firm, Bettendorf, for
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.
Carpenter appeals the judgment and sentence entered after he
pled guilty to domestic abuse assault, in violation of Iowa
Code section 708.2A(3) (2017). Carpenter argues his counsel
was ineffective by permitting him to plead guilty without a
factual basis. We reject Carpenter's arguments and affirm
the district courts judgment and sentence.
original trial information charged Carpenter with domestic
abuse assault with the intent to inflict a serious injury,
second offense, in violation of section 708.2A(3)(b), and as
a habitual offender pursuant to sections 902.8 and 902.9.
Subsequently, an amended and substituted trial information
was filed omitting the reference to "with intent to
inflict a serious injury," and instead referred to the
offense as "Domestic Abuse Assault Second Offense
(Aggravated Misdemeanor)." Also, the habitual offender
sentencing enhancement was dropped. Carpenter entered a
written guilty plea to the amended charge of domestic abuse
assault second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor, and the
court entered an order accepting the plea. In a subsequent
sentencing order, the court again accepted Carpenter's
plea, convicted him of the crime of second-offense domestic
abuse assault in violation of sections 708.1 and
708.2A(3)(a), and sentenced him pursuant to the terms of
the plea agreement.
standard of review for guilty pleas resulting from
counsel's ineffective assistance is de novo. See
State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011),
overruled on other grounds by Schmidt v. State, 909
N.W.2d 778, 789 (Iowa 2018). "As with all
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, [the defendant]
must establish . . . counsel failed to perform an essential
duty and prejudice resulted from such failure."
Id. at 652 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Generally, we
preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for
postconviction-relief proceedings to allow the record to be
developed. See State v. Gomez Garcia, 904 N.W.2d
172, 186 (Iowa 2017); State v. Virgil, 895 N.W.2d
873, 879 (Iowa 2017). However, we may resolve the claim on
direct appeal if the record before us is adequate. See
Virgil, 895 N.W.2d at 879. Here, we conclude the record
is adequate for review.
are required to determine whether a factual basis exists
before accepting a plea. See Iowa R. Crim. P.
On a claim that a plea bargain is invalid because of a lack
of accuracy on the factual-basis issue, the entire record
before the district court may be examined. . . . Recourse to
the entire record is appropriate because . . . the relevant
inquiry . . . involves an examination of whether counsel
performed poorly by allowing [the defendant] to plead guilty
to a crime for which there was no objective factual basis in
State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013).
"If an attorney allows a defendant to plead guilty to an
offense for which there is no factual basis and to waive the
right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, the attorney
breaches an essential duty." State v. Philo,
697 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Iowa 2005). When this occurs, prejudice
is inherent. See State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785,
788 (Iowa 1999).
abuse assault is an assault, as defined in section 708.1,
which is domestic abuse as defined in section 236.2(2)(a),
(b), (c), or (d). See Iowa Code § 708.2A(1). As
relevant here, a person commits an assault when, without
justification, the person does "[a]ny act which is
intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to
result in physical contact which will be insulting or
offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to
execute the act." Id. § 708.1(2)(a).
"Domestic abuse," as is applicable to the offense
of domestic abuse assault in this case, is an assault as
defined in section 708.1 between household members who
resided together at the time of the assault. Id.
§ 236.2(2)(a). Relevant here, "household
members" is defined as "persons cohabitating."
Id. § 236.2(4)(a). Sexual relations between the
parties while sharing the same living quarters is one factor
used to determine whether parties were cohabitating within
the meaning of the domestic abuse statute. Virgil,
895 N.W.2d at 880 (citing State v. Kellogg, 542
N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 1996)).
claims his counsel was ineffective by allowing him to plead
guilty to domestic abuse assault without a factual basis
because there is no clear evidence in the record showing that
the assault occurred between household members residing
together at the time of the assault. We disagree. In an
affidavit attached to the original complaint, a police
officer states "The defendant and the victim are in an
intimate relationship together." The complaint form
states the relationship is between "family/household
members who have lived together within the last year."
In the field case report attached to the trial information,
the officer's narrative states that Ellis and the woman
he assaulted were "in an intimate
relationship with each other and she stays with him in
his camps around the city of Davenport." The minutes of
evidence state that at the time of the incident, "[t]he
pair were in an intimate relationship and living
together." In his written guilty plea, Carpenter
admitted there is a factual basis for the charge and that he
"had intentional offensive contact with another, who