United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division, Waterloo
Williams United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on plaintiff Starlyn Ensz's
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
(Doc. 13). Defendant Chase Bank timely filed a resistance.
(Doc. 15). Concurrently with its resistance, defendant filed
a Request for Judicial Notice, in which defendant requests
that the Court take judicial notice of the requests for
production that plaintiff propounded on defendant. (Docs.
15-1, 15-2). Plaintiff did not file a resistance to
defendant's request for judicial notice. For the
following reasons, plaintiff's motion (Doc. 13) is
granted, and defendant's request for
judicial notice (Doc. 15-1) is denied.
brought her two-count complaint alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Title 47, United States
Code, Section 227(b)(3) (“TCPA”). (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that “[d]efendant
placed collection calls to [p]laintiff seeking and attempting
to collect on alleged debts incurred through purchases made
on credit issued by [d]efendant.” (Id., at 2).
Plaintiff alleges that these collection calls violated the
TCPA. (Id., at 2-5). Plaintiff further alleges that
she never consented to the aforementioned collection calls,
or if she consented she revoked consent prior to the calls at
issue in this case. (Id., at 3).
answer, defendant raised numerous affirmative defenses,
including the affirmative defenses of “Set Off”
and “Prior Express Consent.” (Doc. 6, at 12-13).
Defendant also brought three counterclaims for breach of
contract, account stated, and quantum meruit, based on the
allegations that pursuant to a written agreement with
plaintiff, defendant issued a credit card account in
plaintiff's name, and that plaintiff incurred $4, 742.90
in charges that are now past due. (Doc. 6, at 15-19). In
response, plaintiff filed her motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's
counterclaims. (Doc. 13).
urges the Court not to dismiss the counterclaims because the
counterclaims bear a “loose connection” to the
facts underlying plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 15, at 11).
Specifically, defendant argues that its aforementioned
affirmative defenses put the cardmember agreement and the
amount of plaintiff's alleged debt “squarely at
issue” in this case. (Id., at 7, 13-16).
Defendant further asserts that it placed the calls at issue
to collect the same alleged $4, 742.90 debt underlying the
counterclaims. (Id., at 16-18). For these reasons,
defendant asserts that the counterclaims meet the standard
for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
counterclaims. (Id., at 16-20). Finally, defendant
urges the Court to exercise jurisdiction over defendant's
counterclaims because doing so will promote efficiency, and
there is no basis upon which the Court may exercise its
discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
(Id., at 20-25).
may move, before its answer, to dismiss a claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “In
deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court
must distinguish between a facial attack-where it looks only
to the face of the pleadings-and a factual attack-where it
may consider matters outside the pleadings.” Croyle
ex. rel. Croyle v. United States, 908 F.3d 377, 380 (8th
ruling on a facial challenge, the court assumes all factual
allegations regarding jurisdiction are true, and the court
will grant the motion if claimant fails to allege sufficient
facts to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, “[t]he burden of proving federal
jurisdiction . . . is on the party seeking to establish it,
and [t]his burden may not be shifted to the other
party.” Great Rivers Habitat All. v. Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, 615 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2010) (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
determining subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is mindful
that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568
U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over ‘all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States' and
‘all civil actions' where the amount in controversy
exceeds $75, 000 and complete diversity of citizenship exists
between the parties.” Graf v. Pinnacle Asset Grp.,
LLC, Civ. No. 14-1822-SRN/SER, 2015 WL 632180, at *2 (D.
Minn. Feb. 12, 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332). In addition to federal question and diversity
jurisdiction, courts also have supplemental jurisdiction:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims are a part of the same case
or controversy if they “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact, ” and the parties would ordinarily
expect to try them in one judicial proceeding. ABF
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645
F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Section 1367 provides district courts discretion to
decline supplemental jurisdiction in certain cases, including
under “exceptional circumstances” where
“there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
is no dispute that courts have supplemental jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims, St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare
Int'l, Inc., 250 F.3d 587, 594 (8th Cir. 2001),
which are claims “aris[ing] out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a). The parties
have not cited, nor has the Court found, binding authority
addressing whether supplemental jurisdiction under Section
1367(a) extends beyond the scope of Rule 13(a) to permissive
counterclaims as defined in Rule 13(b). Some courts have held
that supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(a) applies
only to compulsory counterclaims, while other courts have
found that supplemental jurisdiction extends to some
permissive counterclaims. See Graf, 2015 WL 632180,
at *3 (citing numerous cases comparing the competing views on