United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division, Waterloo
WILLIAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the defendants Matthew Tiedt
(“Tiedt”) and Kyles Shores'
(“Shores”) (collectively, “county
defendants”) motion to strike (Doc. 87), which seeks to
strike plaintiff's opposition to the defendants'
second motions for summary judgment (Doc. 85). Plaintiff has
not filed a timely resistance or a request for additional
time to resist the county defendants' motion.
See LR 7(e). For the reasons set forth herein, the
county defendants' motion to strike is granted in
part and denied in part, and the
Court also strikes plaintiff's response to defendants Dan
Schaefer (“Schaefer”) and James Dickinson's
(“Dickinson”) (collectively, “state
defendants”) reply (Doc. 86) as untimely and improper.
September 28, 2018, the state defendants and county
defendants moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 74; Doc. 76).
Plaintiff's resistance to the motions for summary
judgment was due by October 19, 2018. See LR 56(b).
Plaintiff did not file a timely resistance, but on October
30, 2018, plaintiff moved for an extension of time to resist
the defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 79).
The Court provided plaintiff until November 21, 2018, to file
his resistances, and stated “[p]laintiff will not
be given any additional extensions of time to respond to the
pending motions for summary judgment.” (Doc. 80).
On November 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a resistance to
defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 83). The
state defendants filed a timely reply to plaintiff's
resistance. (Doc. 84).
December 21, 2018, plaintiff filed a second opposition to
defendants' motions for summary judgment (Doc. 85)
(“second resistance”) raising new arguments that
plaintiff did not assert in his prior resistance. Plaintiff
also filed a response to the state defendants' reply
(Doc. 86) (“surreply”). Plaintiff did not request
leave from the Court to file the second resistance or the
surreply. On January 2, 2019, the county defendants moved to
strike the second resistance on grounds that it was untimely
under Local Rule 56. (Doc. 87). The county defendants also
request that the Court treat all facts set forth in the
county defendants' statement of undisputed material facts
as conclusively established and grant the county
defendants' motion for summary judgment on that basis.
The county defendants' motion to strike incorrectly
states that plaintiff did not resist the county
defendants' motion for summary judgment until December
21, 2018. (Id. at 2). The motion to strike fails to
recognize plaintiff's resistance (Doc. 83) which
addresses both the state defendants' and the county
defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Court may strike procedurally improper or untimely filings
from the docket under the Court's inherent power to
control the cases on its docket and to sanction conduct which
abuses the judicial process. Chicago Ins. Co. v. City of
Council Bluffs, Iowa, No. 1:07-cv-21, 2012 WL 13018889,
at *2 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 10, 2012). The Court also has
discretion whether to consider an untimely resistance to a
motion for summary judgment. See Watson v. Geithner,
355 Fed. App'x 482, 483 (2d Cir. 2009); Anderson v.
AMR, 348 Fed. App'x 322, 323 (9th Cir. 2009);
Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 863
(11th Cir. 2004); McNair v. Bonaventura, 46 Fed.
App'x 849, 851 (7th Cir. 2002); Featsent v. City of
Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900, 906 (6th Cir. 1995).
Motion to Strike
second resistance is procedurally improper because plaintiff
is only permitted to file one of each category of document
responding to the county defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Local Rule 56 provides that a party may file
“a brief . . . in which the resisting party responds to
each of the grounds asserted in the motion for summary
judgment, ” “a response to the statement of
material facts, ” “a statement of additional
material facts, ” and “an appendix.” LR
56(b). The plain language of the local rules provides that
the resisting party must file one, and only one, of each of
the aforementioned documents. Construing plaintiff's pro
se pleadings broadly, plaintiff's first resistance
includes a response to the county defendants' statement
of material facts (Doc. 83, at 7-8), a brief responding to
the grounds asserted in the county defendants' motion for
summary judgment (id., at 8-16), plaintiff's
affidavit which serves as a statement of additional facts
(Doc. 83-2) and exhibits which constitute plaintiff's
appendix (Doc. 83-1). Given that plaintiff already filed each
of the required documents in response to the county
defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's
second resistance is procedurally improper under Local Rule
56, and the Court, in its discretion, finds that it is proper
to strike it.
even if plaintiff's second resistance were not
procedurally improper, it is untimely. The Court provided
plaintiff until November 21, 2018, to file a resistance to
the defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 80).
The Court specifically advised plaintiff that the Court would
not grant any further extensions of time to resist the
motions for summary judgment. (Id.). Plaintiff filed
his second resistance on December 21, 2018, a month after the
deadline for his resistance passed. (Doc. 85).
county defendants' motion to strike is granted in
part to the extent it seeks to strike
plaintiff's second resistance (Doc. 85). The Court will
not consider plaintiff's second resistance in ruling on
the county defendants' pending motion for summary
county defendants' motion to strike does not recognize
that plaintiff's initial resistance included a response
to the county defendants' statement of undisputed
material facts. (Doc. 87). The motion to strike does not
contain any argument as to why the Court should disregard
plaintiff's response to the county defendants'
statement of undisputed material facts. (Id.) The
court will not develop a party's argument that is raised
in a threadbare or perfunctory way. See Fort Des Moines
Church of Christ v. Jackson, 215 F.Supp.3d 776, 792
(S.D. Iowa 2016). The county defendants' motion to strike
is denied in part to the extent it requests
that the Court deem all facts set forth in the county
defendants' statement of undisputed facts as conclusively
established, and to the extent it requests that the Court
enter summary judgment the county defendants' favor on