from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B.
Newell, District Associate Judge.
Hampton appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of
C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
Hampton was convicted of misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa
Code section 124.401(5) (2017). In this direct appeal,
Hampton contends the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an
allegedly unconstitutional traffic stop and roadside
detention. Hampton also contends his sentence is illegal
because the district court ordered Hampton to pay the costs
for an associated, but dismissed, criminal case.
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution safeguards
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Article I
section 8 "of the Iowa Constitution is substantially
identical in language to the Fourth Amendment[, ]" and
both provisions are "usually deem[ed] . . . identical in
scope, import, and purpose." State v. Kreps,
650 N.W.2d 636, 640-41 (Iowa 2002) (citing Iowa Const. art.
I, § 8; State v. Scott, 409 N.W.2d 465, 467
(Iowa 1987)). The key inquiry of any search-and-seizure claim
is reasonableness under the circumstances presented. See
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)
("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security.'" (citation
the touchstone of any search-and-seizure claim, whether
arising under federal or state law, is reasonableness under
the circumstances presented, Hampton correctly notes that
"[e]ven 'in . . . cases in which no substantive
distinction [appears] between state and federal
constitutional provisions, we reserve the right to apply the
principles differently under the state constitution compared
to its federal counterpart.'" State v.
Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2015) (quoting King
v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 2011)). Of course,
"our independent authority to construe the Iowa
Constitution does not mean that we generally refuse to follow
the United States Supreme Court decisions." State
v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 490 (Iowa 2014).
"Rather, it merely assures that we 'exercise . . .
our best, independent judgment of the proper parameters of
state constitutional commands,' as we are
constitutionally required to do." Gaskins, 866
N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Short, 851 N.W.2d at 490).
exercising our independent judgment, we may determine that
the state constitution provides lesser or greater protection
than its federal counterpart. This was explained by former
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, widely considered
the godfather of independent state constitutionalism:
The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is
the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The right question is what
the state's guarantee means and how it applies to the
case at hand. The answer may turn out the same as it would
under federal law. The state's law may prove to be more
protective than federal law. The state law also may be less
protective. In that case the court must go on to decide the
claim under federal law, assuming it has been raised.
Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 179 (1984). This
understanding of the interplay between the federal
constitution and the state constitutions was adopted by
former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens. See
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring). The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas explained the issue in the search-and-seizure context:
We understand that our holding means that Section 9 of our
Bill of Rights does not offer greater protection to the
individual than the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and it may offer less protection. But our
holding is the construction that is faithful to the
Constitution which our people have adopted, and it is our
duty to interpret that Constitution independent of the
interpretations of federal courts. Heitman v. State,
[815 S.W.2d 681 690 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)].
As the Court of Appeals noted in this case, Heitman
[v. State] does not mean that the Texas Constitution
cannot be interpreted to give less protection than the
federal constitution. It only means that the Texas
Constitution will be interpreted independently. See Hulit
v. State, 947 S.W.2d [707, 709 (Tex. App. 1997)]. Its