from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Mark R.
Lawson (motions to continue and to waive right to speedy
trial), Judge, and Phillip J. Tabor (motion to set aside
guilty plea), District Associate Judge.
defendant challenges the district court's denial of his
motions to continue trial, waive his right to speedy trial,
and set aside his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
A. Singer and JohnPatrick Brown of Winstein, Kavensky &
Cunningham, LLC, Rock Island, Illinois, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary C. Miller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.
[*] Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Goddard appeals the district court's denial of his
pre-plea motions to continue trial and waive his right to
speedy trial, and the denial of his post-sentencing motion to
set aside his guilty plea.
guilty plea waives his right to challenge the court's
rulings on his pre-plea motions to continue trial and waive
his right to speedy trial. See State v. Carroll, 767
N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009) ("It is well-established
that a defendant's guilty plea waives all defenses and
objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.");
State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982)
(agreeing "the defendant's plea waived all defenses
and the right to contest all adverse pretrial rulings"),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 636
N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001); State v. Maxfield, No.
17-1185, 2018 WL 5292089, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2018)
(finding the defendant waived his right to challenge the
district court's failure to rule on his renewed motion to
continue trial when he pled guilty); State v.
Putnam, No. 15-1222, 2016 WL 3309062, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 15, 2016) (recognizing the defendant's
"speedy-trial claim is waived because he pled
response to the State's argument his guilty plea waived
his right to challenge the pre-plea rulings, Goddard asserts
in his reply brief that his plea was not knowing and
voluntary and was therefore invalid. There is "[o]ne
exception to this rule [that] involves irregularities
intrinsic to the plea-irregularities that bear on the knowing
and voluntary nature of the plea." Castro v.
State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). This exception
applies to "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
predicated on the failure of counsel to perform certain
pre-plea tasks that ultimately render the plea involuntary or
unknowing." Id. But Goddard does not challenge
the court's pre-plea rulings under the
ineffective-assistance framework. Thus, we do not consider
these claims further.
Goddard asserts the district court should have granted his
motion to set aside his guilty plea-filed more than two weeks
after he was sentenced. He claims his plea was not knowing
and voluntary because he was unaware the terms of his plea
agreement allowed the court to sentence him to jail time.
This argument is not preserved for our review, as Goddard
failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment. See State
v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 2006) (providing the
defendant's "failure to move in arrest of judgment
bars a direct appeal of his conviction" when the court
properly informed the defendant of the need to file the
motion in order to challenge the guilty plea). In fact,
Goddard filed a written waiver of his right to file a motion
in arrest of judgment at the same time he filed his written
guilty plea. Such waivers are permitted. See
Barnes, 652 N.W.2d at 468 ("[D]efendants charged
with serious or aggravated misdemeanors may enter into a
valid written waiver of the right to file a motion in arrest
of judgment and thus trigger the bar the [Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure] 2.24(3)(a) imposes to challenging a
guilty plea on appeal.").
Goddard's guilty plea waived his right to challenge the
court's adverse pre-plea rulings and because his claim
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary is not preserved
for our review, we affirm.