from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Kim M.
Riley, District Associate Judge.
Carmer appeals his guilty plea to domestic abuse assault
causing bodily injury, second offense.
Smith of The Smith Law Firm, PC, Ames, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
Carmer pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault causing
bodily injury, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 708.1, 708.2A(1), and 708.2A(3)(b) (2018). The
district court sentenced Carmer to an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed two years to be served
consecutively to Carmer's sentences in two different
probation-revocation cases. In this direct appeal, Carmer
contends his written guilty plea to domestic abuse assault
causing bodily injury was defective because he was not
advised the sentence for the offense could be served
consecutively to his sentences in other cases.
procedural matter, we note Carmer is not precluded from
challenging his guilty plea. Here, the plea form advised
Carmer he was required to file a timely motion in arrest of
judgment to contest the adequacy of his guilty plea. However,
the plea form did not inform him that the failure to timely
file a motion in arrest of judgment would preclude his right
to challenge his guilty plea on appeal. This advisement was
required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d). The
State concedes the plea form was deficient and Carmer may
challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal.
See State v. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1994)
(holding failure to fully comply with the requirements of
rule 2.8(2)(d) reinstates a defendant's right to appeal
the legality of a guilty plea).
merits, Carmer is not entitled to any relief. Here, the
written guilty plea advised Carmer of the maximum punishment
for the offense at issue in the plea proceeding. Nothing more
was required under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2) (stating the
defendant must be advised of the "mandatory minimum
punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment
provided by the statute defining the offense to which the
plea is offered." (emphasis added)); State v.
Brammeier, No. 10-1157, 2011 WL 2556076, at *2 n.3 (Iowa
Ct. App. June 29, 2011) ("Nevertheless, we find no
requirement that a defendant be informed that the sentence
being imposed will be served following a sentence the
defendant is already serving for a separate and prior
affirm the defendant's conviction.
C.J., concurs; Vaitheswaran, J., dissents.
VAITHESWARAN, Judge (dissenting)
respectfully dissent. "[T]he accused must be fully aware
of the direct consequences of a guilty plea." State
v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Iowa 1998).
"Sentences to be served consecutively are a direct
consequence of a guilty plea." Id. at 243;
accord State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397,
408 (Iowa 2017) ("We conclude the district court must
inform Weitzel of all direct consequences of the plea in the
oral colloquy or in any written waiver thereof.");
State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Iowa
2016) ("We conclude that Fisher should have been
informed of the mandatory minimum and maximum possible fines,
including surcharges."); cf. State v.
Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Iowa 2016) ("[R]ule
2.23(3)(d) applies to require ...