from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Terry R.
defendant claims trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by allowing him to enter an Alford plea
to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse.
J. Viner of Viner Law Firm, PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Edgren entered an Alford plea to the charge of
assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and was sentenced
to a term of incarceration not to exceed two years, which the
court suspended; placed on probation for two years; and
ordered to register as a sex offender, pursuant to Iowa Code
section 692A.103 (2018). On appeal, Edgren argues trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing him to
enter an Alford plea to the charge because doing so
placed him "in a perpetual loop of impossibility-change
your story or fail at probation and max out the probation and
ensuing violations thereof." Additionally, in passing,
Edgren claims (1) trial counsel failed to advise him of the
consequences of pleading guilty-that he would have to
register as a sex offender and would have to complete sex
offender treatment, (2) there is not a factual basis to
support his plea, and (3) counsel failed to prepare him to
exercise his right of allocution.
defendant claims they received ineffective assistance, the
defendant bears the burden to establish their claim.
Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015).
To do so, Edgren must show both that counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and that prejudice resulted.
See id. "[T]he defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to a guilty plea must
prove that, but for counsel's breach, there is a
reasonable probability he or she would have insisted on going
to trial." State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237,
240 (Iowa 2006).
Edgren does not assert he would have insisted on going to
trial if he had been properly advised by counsel. But even if
he made such an assertion, we would preserve his claims of
ineffective assistance for possible postconviction-relief
proceedings. As our supreme court recognized, "Under the
'reasonable probability' standard, it is abundantly
clear that most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
in the context of a guilty plea will require a record more
substantial than the one now before us." State v.
Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 219 (Iowa 2008) (quoting
State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 2006)).
"[O]nly [in] rare cases will the defendant be able to
muster enough evidence to prove prejudice without a
postconviction relief hearing" because the record from
the district court proceedings is generally "devoid of
evidence indicating [the defendant] would not have pleaded
guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial."
we preserve Edgren's claims of ineffective assistance for
postconviction-relief proceedings. See id.; see
also State v Harris, 919 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Iowa 2018)
("If the development of the ineffective-assistance claim
in the appellate brief was insufficient to allow its
consideration, the court of appeals should not consider the
claim, but it should not outright reject it.").
 We recognize this is not the standard
we apply when the defendant claims trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing the defendant to plead guilty to a
charge for which there is not a factual basis. See State
v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) (providing
that when a defendant claims ineffective assistance based on
lack of factual basis, "the only inquiry is whether the
record shows a factual basis for the guilty plea"
because "[p]rejudice is inherent" when "trial
counsel allows the defendant to plead guilty"
"[w]here a factual basis for a charge does not
exist"). Still, we do not consider Edgren's claim on
direct appeal, as his "random mention of [the] issue,
without elaboration or supportive authority, is ...