Submitted: January 14, 2019
from United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa - Sioux City.
SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
Ingram appeals the district court's denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which seeks relief from the
mandatory minimum sentence imposed for his 2008 conviction
for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute crack cocaine. Ingram's mandatory minimum
sentence was doubled from 10 years to 20 years, pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 851, based on a prior felony drug
conviction. The district court granted a certificate of
appealability on whether imposition of the § 851
enhancement in Ingram's case violated his Fifth Amendment
rights to equal protection and due process ("equal
protection/selective prosecution claim"). Ingram bases
that claim on the geographical disparity in the application
of § 851 enhancements between the Northern District of
Iowa and other districts. Because we hold that Ingram's
§ 2255 motion was untimely, we affirm the district
court's denial of habeas relief.
October 2007, the government charged Ingram with conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams
or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine that contained a cocaine base, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846.
In February 2008, the government filed a notice that it would
seek an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 851 based on
Ingram's prior felony drug conviction in Illinois. The
notice identified Ingram's prior conviction as one for
"[m]anufacture/delivery of controlled substance, in
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on or about October
24, 2001, in case number 01CR2195101."
jury found Ingram guilty of the charged offense. The district
court scheduled Ingram's sentencing for June 16, 2008.
Before sentencing, the probation officer provided the parties
with a presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR scored
Ingram's sentence on the basis of a prior felony
conviction, computed Ingram's guideline range to be 168
to 210 months (14 to 17.5 years), but noted Ingram's
mandatory minimum sentence with the prior conviction
enhancement was 240 months (20 years).
sentencing hearing, the court denied the government's
request for a sentencing enhancement. The court concluded
that the government's evidence inconsistently identified
the purported statute of conviction. The government put some
documents into the record that identified the offense as a
violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/401(D). But,
the government asserted Ingram violated a different
statute-720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/401(d). The court
postponed sentencing to allow a government appeal.
appeal, the government argued the district court erred in
determining the government had not proven Ingram's prior
penalty-enhancing felony drug conviction. This court remanded
on the sentencing enhancement. United States v.
Ingram, 309 F. App'x 66, 68 (8th Cir. 2009).
remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing.
Following the hearing, the court found the government had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ingram had previously
been convicted of a felony drug offense and imposed a
sentence of 240 months (20 years). Ingram appealed. On
February 10, 2010, this court affirmed Ingram's
conviction and sentence. Ingram, 594 F.3d at 981.
on June 15, 2010, Ingram filed a petition for writ of
certiorari. On October 4, 2010, the Supreme Court denied that
petition. Ingram v. United States, 562 U.S. 888
August 27, 2014, Ingram filed his § 2255 motion
asserting, among other things, his equal protection/selective
prosecution claim. The government moved to dismiss the §
2255 motion as untimely. Ingram did not dispute that his
§ 2255 motion was filed more than one year after the
denial of his petition for writ of certiorari. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). However, he argued that his
§ 2255 motion was timely pursuant to a different
"triggering" provision, 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f)(4). That section provides that the one-year period
runs from "the date on which the facts supporting the
claim or claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence." Id. Ingram
asserted that it was not until the publication of United
States v. Young, 960 F.Supp.2d 881 (N.D. Iowa 2013),
that he learned of the substantial disparity in the
imposition of § 851 enhancements between the Northern
District of Iowa and other federal districts. According to
Ingram, because he was an incarcerated person, he could not
have discovered the information on which Young was
based. He argued that a reasonable period of time had to
elapse between the filing of Young, its appearance
in the prison library system, and his discovery of
Young. In summary, he maintained that his §
2255 motion incorporated claims based on new facts concerning
the disparity disclosed in Young and that those
claims were timely filed just over a year after the filing of
district court held that Ingram's claims concerning the
constitutionality of § 851 were timely under §
2255(f)(4). First, the district court concluded that Ingram
proved the existence of new facts based on Young. In
that decision, the district court "point[ed] out that
the Sentencing Commission's 'first and only,
additional targeted coding and analysis project on nationwide
application of 21 U.S.C. § 851 recidivist enhancements
[was] as part of the Report To The Congress: Mandatory
Minimum Penalties In The Federal Criminal Justice System
(Commission's 2011 Report).'" Ingram v.
United States, No. C 14-4071-MWB, 2016 WL 538468, at *7
(N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2016) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Young, 960 F.Supp.2d at 892). The court
noted that the Sentencing ...