from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van
Marel, District Associate Judge.
Shami Muligande appeals his sentence for two charges of
public intoxication, second offense.
L. Dirks of Dirks Law Firm, Ames, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
Shami Muligande pled guilty to two charges of public
intoxication, second offense. Each violation was a serious
misdemeanor under Iowa Code sections 123.46(2) and 123.91
(2018). For each violation, the district court imposed a
one-year term of confinement. The court ran the sentences
consecutively for a total indeterminate term not to exceed
argues "his sentence of two years for two counts of
public intoxication with a prior conviction" violates
the prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment found in the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. This is true, Muligande
argues, because his prison sentence is "grossly
disproportionate" to his crimes. We disagree.
review an allegedly unconstitutional sentence de novo.
State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa
2017). Our review begins with the words of our constitutions.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution reads: "Excessive bail shall not be
required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted."
clause "contain[s] a proportionality provision."
See Crawley v. State, No. 15-1812, 2017 WL
108298, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017) (McDonald, J.,
concurring specially) (citing State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009)). Moreover,
[a]s Justice Thomas noted with respect to the . . . Eighth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution:
"[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was
originally understood as prohibiting torturous
methods of punishment-specifically methods akin to
those that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted." The clause does not
contain a "proportionality principle." In short, it
does not authorize courts to invalidate any punishment they
deem disproportionate to the severity of the crime or to a
particular class of offenders. Instead, the clause
"leaves the unavoidably moral question of who
'deserves' a particular nonprohibited method of
punishment to the judgment of the legislatures that authorize
Id. (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 503-04 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); see,
e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890)
(noting "cruel and unusual punishment" encompasses
barbarous types of punishment, such "as burning
at the stake, crucifixion[, ] breaking on the wheel, or the
parties agree, however, that binding precedent requires this
court to conduct a proportionality review. As our supreme
court recently explained in State v. Wickes,
"[w]e use a three-part test to determine whether a
sentence is 'grossly disproportionate' under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the State ...