from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, James M. Drew,
appeals the denial of his postconviction-relief application.
M. Armbrust of Brown, Kinsey, Funkhouser & Lander,
P.L.C., Mason City, for appellant.
J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ.
found Stephen Broderson guilty of third-degree sexual abuse.
In his direct appeal, he argued the district court
inappropriately admitted hearsay testimony. See State v.
Broderson, No. 16-2054, 2017 WL 4049527, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 2017). This court affirmed. Id. at
filed a postconviction-relief (PCR) application. The district
court dismissed his application. He now appeals.
claims his trial counsel was ineffective in three ways.
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
de novo review because the claim is derived from the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution." Bowman
v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2006). An
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim has two prongs. Both
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001).
First, "the applicant must demonstrate the attorney
performed below the standard demanded of a reasonably
competent attorney." Id. (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). Second,
"the applicant must demonstrate 'that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.'" Id. at 143 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
first argues trial counsel was ineffective for objecting to
the testimony of a sexual-assault nurse examiner instead of
conducting voir dire of the witness outside the presence of
the jury. He claims the "rigorous argument regarding the
admissibility of evidence" following counsel's
objections heightened the importance of the testimony in the
jury's minds. But Broderson does not demonstrate that
counsel's objections fell "below the standard
demanded of a reasonably competent attorney."
Id. at 142. So his first claim fails. See State
v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003) ("A
defendant's inability to prove either element is
next claims counsel was ineffective for failing to seek
dismissal of the entire jury because two prospective jurors
knew about Broderson's past crime. During jury
selection, prospective jurors were asked if they had any
knowledge about the case. Two indicated they did. Each was
questioned individually in a separate room.
first prospective juror knew of Broderson's past crime
from a news story. She admitted to the court she could not be
impartial. But she told the court she had not talked with
anyone else about the matter. The court excused her, and she
second prospective juror also indicated she knew of
Broderson's past crime from a news story. After
questioning by the State and the defense, Broderson's
trial counsel asked the court excuse her for cause. The court
denied this request. Nonetheless, this prospective juror was
not seated because Broderson's trial counsel used a
preemptory strike to exclude her from the jury. See State
v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Iowa 1993) ("We
hold that partiality of a juror may not be made the basis for
reversal in instances in which that juror has been removed
through exercise of a peremptory challenge. Any claim that
the jury that did serve in the case was not impartial must be
based on matters that appear of record.").
not believe these circumstances required counsel to request
dismissal of the entire jury. Moreover, although Broderson
asserts Strickland "prejudice is clear,"
we see no evidence to support this assertion. Neither of
these potential jurors were seated with the jury. And
Broderson provides no evidence either prospective juror
tainted the jury panel. See id. at 746 ("In the
absence of some factual showing that this circumstance
resulted in a juror being seated who was not impartial, ...